Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Douglas J. Allred, George S. Diumenti v. Larry H.
Brown and Arthur J. Ritter : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
William H. Lindsey; James C. Lewis; Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees.
Brian M. Barnard; John Pace; Joro Walker; Utah Legal Clinic; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Douglas J. Allred, George S. Diumenti v. Larry H. Brown, No. 930815 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5712

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

qw%\$
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI,
Plaintiffs and
Appellees,

Case No. 93-0463-

of/s-('4

vs.
LARRY H. BROWN and
ARTHUR J. RITTER,
Defendant and
Appellant

Priority No. \&

16

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
LARRY H. BROWN
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT
ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, PRESIDING.
(Case Below No. C-86-090-3354)
Attorneys for Appellant and
Defendant Larry H. Brown
BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JOHN PACE
USB #5624
JORO WALKER
USB #6676
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
214 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 - 3204
Phone:
328-9531 or 328-9532

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees
Allred and Diumenti
WILLIAM H. LINDSEY
JAMES C. LEWIS
505 South Main street
Bountiful, Utah
84010
Phone:
292-0447

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

APR t \ W\

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI,
Plaintiffs and
Appellees,

Case No. 93-0467

vs.
LARRY H. BROWN and
ARTHUR J. RITTER,
Defendant and
Appellant

Priority No. 16

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
LARRY H. BROWN
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT
ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, PRESIDING.
(Case Below No. C-86-090-3354)
Attorneys for Appellant and
Defendant Larry H. Brown
BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JOHN PACE
USB # 5624
JORO WALKER
USB # 6676
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
214 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 - 3204
Phone:
328-9531 or 328-9532
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees
Allred and Diumenti
WILLIAM H. LINDSEY
JAMES C. LEWIS
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah
84010
Phone:
292-0447

TABLE OP CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

I. Cases
II. Statutes and Rules

iii
iii

III.

iii

Other Authorities

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD
OF REVIEW
I • Issues

2
2

II.

Standard of Review

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
II.

4

Nature of the Case

4

Course of Proceedings and Dispositions Below

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

17

ARGUMENT

20

I.

No Bailment Existed Between Diumenti and
Brown
A. Because the Trial Court Already
Determined that No Contract Existed
Between Diumenti And Brown, there Can Be
No Bailment Between the Two
B. There Is Insufficient Evidence To
Establish a Bailment Between Diumenti
and Brown
C. As an Agent Of Ritter, Brown Is Not Party
To and Therefore Not Liable On Any Contract Entered Into By Ritter, a Fully
Disclosed Principal

i

20

20
21

24

II.

Assuming that a Bailment Existed Between
Diumenti and Brown, the Terms Of this
Agreement Are Implied and Therefore Do Not
Include Any Provisions Concerning Insurance.
A.

26

Because the Trial Court AlreadyDetermined that No Contract Existed
Between Diumenti and Brown, the Terms Of
Any Supposed Bailment Between the Two
Must Be Implied
Even If A Bailment Existed Between
Diumenti And Brown, the Law of Bailments
Would Not Require Brown To Insure The
Airplane

28

III. Assuming that a Bailment Existed Between
Diumenti and Brown, Brown is Not Liable for
Damages to the Airplane Pursuant to this
Agreement Because He Was Not Negligent in His
Operation of the Aircraft

30

B.

A.

Before A Bailee Is Liable For Damages To
the Bailed Object, there Must Be a
Finding Of Negligence and Proximate
Cause
The Trial Court Made No Finding That
Brown Was Negligent or that His Conduct
Was the Proximate Cause Of the Damage To
the Airplane
At Trial, Brown Established that He
Exercised All Due Care In His Operation
Of the Aircraft
At Trial, Diumenti Did Not Provide Any
Evidence To Establish that Brown Was
Negligent In His Operation Of the
Aircraft

37

Diumenti's Cause of Action Against Brown For
Negligence Should Be Dismissed Because There
Was No Evidence At Trial That Brown Was
Negligent In His Operation Of The Airplane*. .

40

B.

C.
D.

IV.

26

30

33
34

CONCLUSION

41

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

44

APPENDIX

45

LIST OF APPELLANTS EXHIBITS

46
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
I.

Cases

Aircraft Sales & Service v. Gantt, 52 So.2d 388 (Ala. 1951)
37
Barlow Upholstery & Furniture v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900 (Utah
1975)
29, 30
Carev v. Wallner, 744 P.2d 881 (Mont. 1987)
Christensen v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1982)
Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989)

32
. . . . 5
3

Edwards & Daniels v. Farmers' Properties, 228 Utah Adv. Rep.
14 (Utah App. 1993)
3
Potomac Ins. Co. v. Nickson, 64 Utah 395, 231 P. 445 (1924)
20
Romey v. Covey Garage, 111 P.2d 545 (Utah 1941) . . . 31, 37
Scharf v. BMG Corp. . 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985)

3

Staheli v. Farmers/ Co-Op of Southern Utah. 655 P.2d 680
(Utah 1982)
31, 32, 37
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680
(Utah 1943)
6, 20, 29, 30, 32, 37, 40
II.

Statutes and Rules

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as amended)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1953 as amended)

2

III.

Other Authorities

8 Am.Jur.2d, Bailments
8 C.J.S., Bailments
Restatement

(Second),

(1980)
(1980)

20, 29
20, 29

Agency

24,25
iii

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OP
THE STATE OP UTAH

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI,
Plaintiffs and
Appellees,

Case No. 93-0467

vs.
LARRY H. BROWN and
ARTHUR J. RITTER,
Defendant and
Appellant

Priority No. 16

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
LARRY H. BROWN
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT
ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, PRESIDING.
(Case Below NO. C-86-090-3354)

Defendant/appellant, Larry H. Brown ("Brown") by and
through counsel of record, submits the following Brief of
Appellant:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as
amended).

However, the Utah Supreme Court has assigned this

case to this Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(4) (1953 as amended)•

STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OP REVIEW
I.

Issues
1.

The trial court erred when it found a bailment

between plaintiffs Douglas Allred and George Diumenti
(collectively "Diumenti")1 and Brown where the court had
already ruled that no contract existed between Diumenti and
Brown and where there was no evidence to establish that any
bailment agreement existed between Diumenti and Brown, or
that any such agreement between the two should be implied.
2.

The trial court erred when it found that a supposed

bailment between Diumenti and Brown included an agreement
that Brown provide insurance for Diumenti's airplane where
there was no evidence to establish that any bailment agreement2 —

much less an agreement concerning insurance

—

existed between Diumenti and Brown and where the law does
not imply that Brown, as a bailee, insure the- airplane.
1

The second plaintiff, Douglas J. Allred was not
involved in any of the dealings, meetings, transactions,
etc. pertinent to this lawsuit.
2

Brown has marshalled all of the evidence presented
which might support such a finding in the Appendix.
2

3.

The trial court erred in awarding damages against

Brown on the basis of a bailment between Diumenti and Brown
where the court made no finding that Brown was negligent.
4.

Because there was no evidence that Brown was negli-

gent and ample evidence that Brown exercised the requisite
care of Diumenti's airplane and because a finding of
negligence is necessary before liability can be imposed, the
trial court erred in holding Brown liable for damage to
Diumenti7s airplane.

II.

Standard of Review
To challenge the trial court's factual finding that a

bailment existed between Diumenti and Brown, Brown must "(1)
marshall all of the evidence that supports the finding, and
(2) demonstrate that, despite the evidence, the finding is
so lacking in support as to be *against the clear weight of
evidence7 and thus, clearly erroneous."

Edwards & Daniels

v. Farmers' Properties, 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 (Utah App.
1993),

P.2d

, quoting,

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d

1176, 1178 (Utah 1989).
However, this court should review the correctness of
the trial court's legal conclusions.
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
3

Scharf v. BMG Corp.,

Accordingly, this court

should not defer to the following erroneous legal conclusion
made by the trial court:
1.

that a bailment agreement, which included an

insurance provision, existed between the Diumenti and Brown
since the trial court had already ruled that no contract
existed between Diumenti and Brown;
2.

that Brown could be liable for damages on the

airplane since the trial court made no finding that Brown
was negligent in his operation of the airplane; and,
3.

that Brown could be liable for damages on the

airplane since Brown established that he was not negligent
and although Diumenti did not provide any evidence to show
negligence,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
To resolve this case, this Court must interpret the

common law of bailments.

While bailment may be a straight

forward notion, several issues complicate this case.
As this Court has already noted, "[a] bailment is
created when a party's personal property is delivered to
another *in trust for a specific purpose, with an express or
implied contract that the property will be returned or
4

accounted for when the specific purpose has been
accomplished or when the bailor reclaims the property.'"
Decision of Utah Court of Appeals in First Appeal, May 12,
1992, ("Decision in First Appeal") at 2, fn. 1, exhibit "a"
attached, quoting

Christensen v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525, 528-

29 (Colo. 1982).
On the basis of this analysis, this Court must decide
whether, by piloting the airplane for Ritter, Brown became a
bailee of the aircraft.

This inquiry must consider, among

other issues, that the trial court has already determined
that no contract ever existed between Brown and Diumenti.
Decision in First Appeal at 3.

The trial court dismissed

Diumenti's breach of contract claim against Brown on the
basis that any agreement concerning the airplane was made
between only Diumenti and Ritter.

Primary Trial Transcript

at 74.
If, despite the trial court's dismissal, this Court
does find that a bailment exists between Diumenti and Brown,
this Court must then determine if, pursuant to this bailment, Brown is liable for damages to the airplane.

This

Court has already held that negligence "is the basis for
liability in a cause of action for bailment."
First Appeal at 3, citing,

Decision in

Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc.,
5

103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 at 685-86 (Utah 1943) (other
citations omitted).

Thus, this Court's determination

concerning liability must reflect that the trial court made
no finding that Brown was negligent in his operation of the
airplane.

Indeed, Brown provided sufficient evidence to

prove that he exercised due care in his operation of
airplane and Diumenti offered no evidence to counter this
conclusion.
Finally, because the trial court has refused to rule on
Diumenti's negligence theory —
appeal of this case —

and avoid a possible third

this Court should determine that the

evidence at trial is sufficient to determine that Brown
exercised due care in his operation of the airplane.

II.

Course of the Proceedings and Dispositions Below
Diumenti sued Brown and Ritter for damages caused to

his airplane in a May 9, 1984 accident at the Tooele County
Airport, asserting (1) breach of contract; (2) negligence;
and (3) bailment.
attached.

Plaintiffs7 Complaint, exhibit "1"

The case was tried in April 1989 before the

Honorable James Sawaya in the Third District Court of Salt
Lake County.

During that trial, the court dismissed the

6

first cause of action —
against Brown.

the breach of contract claim

—

Primary Trial Transcript at 74.

However, in a Memorandum Decision issued on June 14,
1989, (exhibit "g" attached), and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law entered on July 18, 1989, (exhibit lfhlf
attached), the court ruled that Ritter and Brown were
jointly and severally liable for damages to the airplane
because they failed to fulfill their contractual obligation
to insure the airplane.

The court made no ruling on

Diumenti's bailment or negligence claims and awarded
substantial monetary damages against Ritter and Brown.
Brown immediately appealed that decision.

Id.

In an

unpublished opinion dated May 12, 1992, this Court agreed
that Brown could not be labile to Diumenti for breach of
contract.

Decision in First Appeal, exhibit "a" attached.

This Court remanded the case to the trial court for
reconsideration of Diumenti's bailment and negligence causes
of action.

Id.

On June 8, 1993, oral arguments concerning this Court's
decision were made to Judge Sawaya, now retired, but sitting
by special assignment.

The parties submitted written

argument to the trial court, but presented no further
evidence.

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
7

dated July, 1993 (exhibit "b" attached) and Order and
Judgment dated September 7, 1993, (exhibit "c" attached),
the trial court again awarded the same damages assessed
against Brown after the 1989 trial, but now on a bailment
theory.

The court concluded that "under the bailment, there

was an express agreement between the parties that defendants
would obtain insurance to cover the airplane. . . . "

Id. at

3.
Immediately after this second decision was handed down,
Brown moved the trial court to make findings with regard to
the negligence theory.

Brown's Motion for New Trial & for

Amended Findings & for More Findings, dated June 23, 1993,
exhibit "e" attached.

Although Brown has subsequently

requested that the trial court rule upon that motion, the
See,

trial court has yet to do so.

Notice to Submit for

Decision, dated August 23, 1993; a duplicate copy of which
was filed on or about November 4, 1993, exhibit "f"
attached.3

3

In light of the trial court's declination to rule
upon Brown's Motion for New Trial dated June 23, 1993,
(exhibit "e" attached) and in light of the entry of the new
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (exhibit "b"
attached) in July, 1993 and the entry of said new Order and
Judgment, (exhibit "c" attached) on September 7, 1993, Brown
must assume that the trial court has denied his motion for a
new trial.
8

Brown is now appealing the trial court7s second ruling.
His notice of appeal (exhibit "d" attached) dated September
9, 1993 was timely filed,

STATEMENT OP PACTS
At the time relevant to this proceeding, Brown was the
manager of operations and chief pilot of a company, (Primary
Trial Transcript at 5-6), for which co-defendant Ritter was
the business manager.

Id. at 77. The company, Mercury

Aircourier Service ("Mercury"), provided passenger air
service and transported cargo by airplane to various sites
in Utah.

Id. at 24. As business manager of Mercury, Ritter

was responsible for all the routine business functions of
the company including "contracting for aircraft" for the
company to use.

Id. at 77. Brown's duties, in contrast,

centered upon flying the company's airplanes.

Id, at 5-6.

In April 1984, Ritter entered into negotiations to
lease a Cessna 414 airplane belonging to Diumenti as part of
Mercury's new business venture.

Primary Trial Transcript at

34; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (July, 1989) at
2, 5 2 (exhibit "h").

Ritter and Brown met with Diumenti at

Ritter's home to discuss the general terms of a lease that

9

would be entered into by Mercury.

Primary Trial Transcript

at 34.
The trial court determined, Ritter, not Brown, was
responsible for the lease of the aircraft from its owners.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (July, 1989) at 2, 51
2 (exhibit "h" attached).

When it dismissed Diumenti's

first cause of action for breach of contract against Brown,
the trial court also concluded that there was no evidence to
establish that a contract of any sort existed between
Diumenti and Brown concerning the airplane.

Primary Trial

Transcript at 73-72.
Diumenti testified that, in all his discussions with
Ritter, he understood that he was dealing with Ritter alone
and that no third party was involved in the contract
negotiations.

Partial Trial Transcript (Diumenti) at 7, 9,

10, 33, 42 & 43.

Diumenti recalled that Brown was

introduced to him as Ritter,s agent, as the person who would
fly the aircraft if Ritter were to lease it from Diumenti.
Id. at 8.

Diumenti told the trial court specifically that

the agreement concerning the airplane was made with Ritter,
and "absolutely" not with Brown.

Id. at 52. Ritter

collaborated these statements, claiming that at no time
during the discussion of securing insurance for the airplane
10

did Brown suggest that he would be responsible for obtaining
the insurance.

Primary Trial Transcript at 81. Brown also

testified that he never intended to secure insurance for the
plane and never told anyone else that he would.

Id. at 53-

54.
Unfortunately, before any written lease was signed
between Ritter and Diumenti, while negotiations of the terms
of the lease and inspection of the plane were both still in
progress, the airplane sustained substantial damages
($30,000.00+) in a landing at the Tooele County Airport.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (July, 1989) at 5 6.
At the time of the accident, Brown was flying the plane and
Ritter was the only passenger.
22.

Primary Trial Transcript at

Brown and Ritter were on their way to have the airplane

weighed to comply with the rules of the Federal Aviation
Administration.

Id. at 30. Ritter instructed Brown to fly

the aircraft to Tooele, Utah, to refuel it and to fly it to
Logan, Utah for its weighing.

Id. at 59.

Before May 9th, the day of the accident, neither Ritter
nor Brown had the keys to the airplane.
Transcript at 148 & 208.

Primary Trial

During this time, the aircraft was

sometimes parked on the ramp in front of Thompson Beechcraft

11

at the Salt Lake Airport and was sometimes gone from that
location.

Id.

At the time of the accident, neither Brown nor Mercury
was covered by Diumenti's property damage insurance on the
plane.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (July, 1993)

at f 10. There was no insurance coverage provided by
Mercury or by the defendants to pay for the damage to the
plane.

Id.

However, at the time of the accident, Brown

thought that the airplane was insured —
to fly the airplane uninsured.

he never intended

Id. at 222.

At trial, there was no evidence that Brown was negligent in his operation of the airplane or during the fateful
landing, or that his conduct was the proximate cause of the
accident.

Indeed, Brown established his significant flying

credentials and detailed the steps which he followed before
attempting to land the airplane before the accident, demonstrating that he exercised all due care in his operation of
the airplane.

In response, Diumenti was unable to provide

any evidence which cast doubt on Brown's competency and
reasonableness or to show that Brown's conduct was the cause
of the accident.
First, Brown established himself as a very experienced
pilot.

His career as a pilot began when he entered the Air
12

Force in 1954. Primary Trial Transcript at 6.

By 1974,

when Brown retired from the Air Force, he had already logged
over four thousand (4,000) hours of flight time in the
service of his country.

Id. at 9.

In 1964 Brown obtained a

commercial license with instrument privileges as a result of
his military experience.

Id. at 7.

While from 1974 to 1980

Brown flew only recreationally, in 1980 he resumed flying
regularly, this time as a commercial pilot for Air Express,
Inc.

Id.

In this capacity, Brown flew a variety of air-

planes including Cessnas 210 and 172, (Id. at 10-12), double
engine airplanes as well as those with retractable landing
gear.

Id. at 12 & 14.

Before the accident, Brown flew Diumenti's airplane as
a copilot and made three or four partial landings —
arounds —

or go-

during which the plane was not completely

stopped, but was touched down on the runway.

Id. at 60.

These maneuvers required Brown to operate the landing gear
three or four times.

Id.

Before the accident, Brown also

took forty-five (45) minutes on one or two occasions to
familiarize himself with the controls of the airplane.

Id.

at 18-19.
At trial, Brown carefully explained the prelanding
checklist that he used to prepare for landing the airplane
13

before the accident.

Primary Trial Transcript at 210-212.

Ritter, a licensed former Air Force pilot with twenty years
of experience with the military, "challenged" Brown as to
each item on the list and Brown would react appropriately.
Id.

In response to the challenge concerning the landing

gear, Brown lowered the landing gear with the proper handle,
saw the lowered nose gear in an exterior mirror designed for
this purpose, felt the initial buffet that occurs when the
gear is lowered and saw the indicator light that shows that
the gear is lowered and locked.

Id. at 211.

Approximately three or four miles from the airport,
Ritter reiterated the landing gear challenge and Brown again
checked that the handle was in the down position, looked at
the extended nose gear in the mirror and saw that the geardown light was on, before he responded to Ritter that the
gear was down and locked.

Id. at 212-213.

This additional

check of the landing gear was a common procedure for Air
Force pilots.

Id.

From the time that the landing gear was

lowered and locked, Brown and Ritter continued to feel a
drag that occurs when the gear is locked into landing
position.

Id.

Not until the propeller of the airplane contacted the
runway, did Brown realize that the landing gear had mal14

functioned.

Id. at 214. Once aware of the problem, Brown

attempted a "go-around" —

a maneuver which would take the

airplane back into full flight.

Id. at 215. However,

because the right engine of the plane failed to generate
sufficient power, Brown was forced to abandon this effort.
Id.

After the crash, but before leaving the airplane, Brown

checked and determined that the landing gear lever was in
the down position.

Id.

at 216.

The testimony of Ritter collaborates Brown's testimony
that the landing gear was indeed down and locked when the
airplane approached the runway and that Brown, as the pilot,
followed all standard procedures to land the airplane
properly.

Id. at 95 & 97. Ritter also agreed that the

right engine was quitting when Brown attempted to do a goaround.

Id. at 94-95.

Paul Johnson, appearing for Brown, testified that once,
in Diumenti's airplane, as pilot, he had experienced a
problem with the landing gear, fid, at 18 5), and twice had
the engines quit on him after he had landed the aircraft.
Id. at 188.
In response, Diumenti offered no evidence to counter
Brown's demonstration that he exercised due care in his
flying of the airplane.

Diumenti presented no evidence that
15

Brown,s conduct was the proximate cause of the accident.
For example, Donald L. Magnuson, the official from the
Federal Aviation Administration (the "FAA") whose job it was
to investigate this accident, testified that in his report
concerning the accident, he expressed no opinion as to the
cause of the accident.

Primary Trial Transcript at 67.

Although the landing gear was retracted when Magnuson
inspected the airplane and he later tested the gear and
found it apparently functioning, Magnuson made no assertions
or even suggestions concerning the cause of the accident or
whether the landing gear was functioning properly when the
airplane landed.

Id.

at 62-72.

Magnuson made no

inspection of either of the engines of the airplane, (Id. at
69-70), and did not test the landing gear with the weight of
the airplane on it.

Id. at 64-65.

Ron Nelson, called by Diumenti as a "rebuttal" witness,
did not see the airplane after the accident and also
declined to speculate on the cause of the accident.

Id, at

239 & 243.
Allen Woodhouse, also Diumenti's witness who helped
repair the airplane after the accident, testified that
according to his experience, there is no way to raise the
landing gear except with the lever intended for that
16

function.

Id. at 256. However, Woodhouse also declined to

speculate on the cause of the accident.

Id. at 247-2 56.

Finally, the court remarked, at the close of Diumenti's
case, that
There's no testimony that they [Ritter and Brown]
failed to do anything. The testimony as I understand it and the state of the evidence is simply
that the aircraft crashed because the landing gear
was not in the down position — either was not in
a down position or was in the down position and
collapsed.
Id. at 75.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court had no basis for finding Brown liable
for the damage caused to the airplane during the ill-fated
Tooele landing.
First, the trial court erred in its determination that
a bailment existed between Diumenti and Brown.

Having

already determined that Brown was not liable to Diumenti for
breach of contract, the trial court could not properly hold
Brown liable to Diumenti under a bailment theory.
evidence —

The same

that Diumenti bargained exclusively with Ritter

and believed he was dealing exclusively with Ritter —

which

proved that Diumenti and Ritter, not Brown, were parties to
any contract concerning the airplane, also shows that Ritter
17

and Diumenti, not Brown, were parties to any bailment of the
airplane.

Furthermore, as an agent of a fully disclosed

principal, Brown is not liable on a contract entered into by
Ritter.
Second, the trial court erred when, on the basis of an
alleged express agreement, it insisted that Brown had a duty
to obtain insurance for the airplane.

Because the trial

court had already determined that Brown was not a party to
any contract concerning insurance, he could not be party to
any bailment contract that included express terms concerning
insurance.

Furthermore, all parties agreed at trial that

Brown never promised or suggested —
statements —

never made any express

that he would take any steps toward securing

insurance for the plane.

As a result, any bailment which

might involve Brown must be an implied bailment.

However,

the law has long concluded that under a implied bailment,
the bailee is under no obligation to insure or act as
insurer of the object of the bailment.
Third, the trial court was mistaken when it found Brown
liable for damages to the airplane under a supposed bailment
contract.

A finding of negligence is necessary before a

bailee can be liable for damages under a bailment —
trial court made no such finding.
18

Furthermore, Brown

the

established at trial that he exercised due care in his
handling and operation of the aircraft.

In turn, Diumenti

offered no evidence to counter this showing.

As a result,

Brown cannot be liable for damages to the airplane under a
bailment theory.
Finally, this Court should dismiss, with prejudice,
Diumenti's cause of action alleging Brown's negligence.

At

trial, Diumenti was completely unable to provide any
evidence that Brown was negligent in his operation of the
airplane.

Brown has repeatedly asked the trial court to

make a determination on this cause of action and he has been
refused.

In addition, this Court previously remanded

Diumenti7s negligence claim to the trial court for determination, which it declined to do.

To avoid subjecting

Brown to the prospect of continued meritless litigation,
this Court should rule on this issue by dismissing
Diumenti's negligence claim.

19

ARGUMENT
I.

No Bailment Existed Between Diumenti and Brown.

A. Because the Trial Court Already Determined that No
Contract Existed Between Diumenti And Brown, there Can Be No
Bailment Between the Two.
A bailment is a contract.

As this Court explained in

its first decision in this case, the "^relation [between]
bailor and bailee is created in contract.'"

Decision in

First Appeal at 2 (exhibit "a" attached), quoting,

Potomac

Ins. Co. v. Nickson. 64 Utah 395, 231 P. 445, 448 (Utah
1924); also

citing,

Sumsion v. Streator-Smith. Inc.. 103

Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680, 685 (1943) ("the entire duty of the
bailee with respect to the bailed chattel is based on the
bailment contract").

As a result, because there was no

contract (either express, implied or constructed) between
Diumenti and Brown, there can be no bailment.
Bailment agreements are a subset of all contracts.

The

same elements and inquiries which govern the formation and
sufficiency of a contract govern the formation and sufficiency of a bailment.
Bailments

Sumsion, 132 P.2d at 685; 8 Am.Jur.2d,

§ 54 (1980); 8 C.J.S., Bailments

§ 19 (1980).

Because a cause of action based on the law of contracts is
analogous to one founded on a bailment, the trial court's
dismissal of Diumenti's contract claim against Brown
20

requires that the bailment claim against Brown also be
dismissed.4

Where there is no contract, there can be no

bailment.

B. Tbere Is Insufficient Evidence To Establish a Bailment
Between Diumenti and Brown.
As explained above, the dismissal of Diumenti's
contract claim against Brown dictates that Diumenti's
bailment claim also be dismissed against Brown.

Further-

more , the trial court's determination that there was
insufficient evidence to establish a contract between
Diumenti (leading to the dismissal of the contract claim)
indicates that there was insufficient dealings between
Diumenti and Brown for the purposes of creating a bailment
agreement.

4

Although this Court, on the first appeal, closely
identified a contract claim with a bailment claim, it did
not specifically dismiss the bailment claim against Brown on
the basis of the trial court's dismissal of the contract
claim. Decision in First Appeal at 2. However, this court
was never asked to do so. Id. at 1. Furthermore, while
this court previously refused to equate Diumenti's bailment
claim with his contract claim, it did so on the basis that
the trial court made no finding concerning negligence — a
requirement for attaching liability to a bailment. Id. at
3.
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The evidence presented at trial fails to establish that
any agreement existed between Diumenti and Brown.5

For

example, in all his discussions with Ritter, Diumenti
understood that he was dealing with Ritter and that no one
else was party to the negotiations concerning the airplane.
Partial Trial Transcript (Diumenti) at 7, 9, 10, 33, 42 &
43.

Before negotiations concerning the airplane were begun,

Brown was introduced to Diumenti as Ritter7s agent —
person who would fly the airplane —

the

rather than as a party

to any agreement concerning the aircraft.

Id. at 8.

Diumenti told the trial court specifically that the
agreement concerning the airplane was made with Ritter, and
"absolutely" not with Brown.

Id. at 52.

Diumenti also testified that Brown never promised or
stated that he, Brown, would take any steps concerning
insuring the airplane.

Id. at 50-51.

Instead, Brown's only

role related to the agreement was that he would be the sole
Ritter7s testimony

person who would fly the airplane.

Id.

confirms Diumenti's understanding.

Ritter stated that at no

time during the discussion of securing insurance for the

5

Brown has marshalled all of the evidence that might
support a finding of a bailment and agreement between
Diumenti and Brown, attached hereto as an appendix.
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airplane did Brown suggest that he would be responsible for
obtaining the insurance.

Primary Trial Transcript at 81.

Given that neither Diumenti, Ritter nor Brown believed
that Brown was a party to the airplane agreement, that
Brown's role in the airplane agreement was that he would
pilot the plane and that Brown never made any promises or
other statements that he would take any steps concerning
insurance for the plane, it is clear that there was no
bailment between Diumenti and Brown.

Instead, Ritter and

Diumenti were the only parties to the lease agreement, and
any bailment of the airplane was between Diumenti and
Ritter.

Because the contract was not with Brown, as

Diumenti testified and the trial court concluded, then the
any bailment cannot be with Brown.

The law of contract and

the law of bailment has never been that by acting only as
the pilot of an airplane, an individual will somehow become
party to any general agreement concerning that aircraft.6

6

The presence of Ritter in the plane at the time it
crashed and was damaged is consistent with the theory that
there was a contract or a bailment with Ritter, but not with
Brown. Although Brown was piloting the plane at the time of
the crash, Ritter was in possession of the plane and Brown
only his pilot.
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C
As an Agent Of Ritter, Brown Is Not Party To and
Therefore Mot Liable On Any Contract Entered Into By Ritter,
a Fully Disclosed Principal.
The fundamental tenets of agency law hold that the
agent of a disclosed principal is not party to a contract
entered into by her principal —

even when the agent

participates in the formation of the contract on behalf of
the principal.

Restatement

(Second),

Agency § 320.

Because

Brown was acting only as Ritter's agent or servant for the
purposes of operating the airplane, he is not party to any
agreement concerning the aircraft.

Id.

The evidence clearly established that Ritter was the
sole defendant party to any agreement concerning the
airplane.

The trial court determined that Ritter, not

Brown, leased the aircraft from Diumenti, (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law (July, 1989) at 2, 5 2) and that no
contract existed between Diumenti and Brown concerning the
airplane.

Primary Trial Transcript at 74, Decision in First

Appeal at 3.

Diumenti specifically testified that he

entered into a lease agreement concerning the airplane with
Ritter, not Brown.

Partial Trial Transcript at 52. Thus,

Diumenti always knew that he was dealing with Ritter, not
Brown, in entering an agreement concerning the plane.
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These same findings and facts show that Brown's role in
any agreement concerning the airplane was necessarily
limited to acting as an agent or a servant of Ritter.

Id.

Brown was not a party to the agreement concerning the plane
and no one thought that he was.

Id.

Instead, Brown was

introduced as and understood to be Ritter's agent —
pilot of the plane Ritter intended to lease.
Transcript at 8 & 51-52.

the

Partial Trial

Brown never made any promises to

anyone suggesting that he would obtain insurance for the
airplane.

Id.

Given Brown's role as pilot, rather than as a party to
the airplane agreement, agency law requires that Ritter be
solely liable for any contract or bailment which involved
the airplane.

Brown, as Ritter's agent or servant, is not

liable for an agreement (either express, implied or
constructed) between Diumenti and Ritter.7
(Second)

Agency,

Restatement

§ 320. Again, the law does not hold Brown

to be party to an agreement concerning the airplane solely
on the basis that Brown was to be the pilot of the plane.
7

An agent or a servant is liable for her or his
tortious conduct. Restatement
(Second) Agency § 350.
However, to make a successful tort claim, Diumenti must show
that Brown acted unreasonably, failed to exercise due care
and that Brown's negligence was the proximate cause of the
damage to the airplane. Diumenti has not done this.
See,
infra, at Points III & IV.
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II. Assuming that a Bailment Existed Between Diumenti and
Brown, the Terms Of this Agreement Are Implied and Therefore
Do Not Include Any Provisions Concerning Insurance.
A. Because the Trial Court Already Determined that No
Contract Existed Between Diumenti and Brown, the Terms Of
Any Supposed Bailment Between the Two Must Be Implied.
The trial court erred when it concluded that "under the
bailment, there was an express agreement between the parties
that defendants would obtain insurance to cover the airplane
during the time the airplane was in the defendants [sic]
possession,"

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (July,

1993), f 8 (emphasis added); see, Appendix for marshalled
facts.

In light of its previous determination that there

was no agreement between Diumenti and Brown and its
dismissal of Diumenti's breach of contract claim against
Brown, (Primary Trial Transcript at 74, Decision in First
Appeal at 3), the trial court cannot rule that Brown was a
party to any expressed agreement with Diumenti.
While the trial court had decided that "the oral
agreement between the parties was that defendants agreed
either to take steps to be added to plaintiff's insurance,
or to obtain their own insurance policy," (Memorandum
Decision (June, 1989) , 5 2 (exhibit "g" attached), it also
specifically rejected the possibility that a such an
agreement concerning insurance existed between Diumenti and
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Brown.

Primary Trial Transcript at 73-74; Decision in First

Appeal at 3.

Brown was not a party to the express agreement

concerning insurance.

Id.

Brown never personally and

expressly agreed to secure insurance.

Therefore, any

bailment to which Brown is a party cannot contain an
"express agreement" concerning insurance —

he made no such

agreement.
In addition, the same evidence discussed above which
established, (1) that Ritter, not Brown was the sole
defendant party to the airplane agreement; (2) that Brown
never made any promises or suggestions that he would secure
insurance for his operation of the aircraft; and (3) that
Brown's role in the airplane agreement was limited to that
of Ritter's agent, to pilot the leased aircraft, also proves
that there was no express agreement between Diumenti and
Brown concerning insurance for the aircraft.

Because Brown

was an agent or servant of Ritter, a fully disclosed
principal, the tenets of agency law specifically require
that Brown not be held liable on an express agreement which
was made between and on behalf of Diumenti and Ritter.
Thus, on the basis of the evidence, the trial court's
prior dismissal of the contract claim against Brown and
agency law, there could not be an express agreement between
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Diumenti and Brown concerning the insurance for the
airplane.8

This is particularly true because testimony from

Diumenti, Ritter and Brown confirms that Brown never said
that he would he would do anything to insure the airplane.
Partial Trial Transcript (Diumenti) at 50-51; Primary Trial
Transcript at 55 & 81. As a result/ any express insurance
agreement necessarily was between Diumenti and Ritter alone.

B. Even If A Bailment Existed Between Diumenti And Brown,
the Law of Bailments Would Not Require Brown To Insure The
Airplane.
When the terms of a bailment agreement are not express,
but only implied, the courts do not impose a duty on the
bailee to insure the bailed chattel.

Although required to

exercise due care toward the bailed property, the bailee has
no duty to insure the property.

As the Utah Supreme Court

explained:
Since there was no express contract in this case,
the rights and duties of the parties are controlled by the contract which is implied by law
from their conduct. . . . [T]he liability of the
bailee is founded on negligence for the law will
not now imply an undertaking on the part of the
bailee to insure the safekeeping of the chattels
bailed.
8

Brown has marshalled all of the evidence on the
record that might support finding an express agreement
between Diumenti and Brown. The inventory of the evidence
is attached to this memorandum as an Appendix.
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Sumsion. 132 P.2d at 685 (citations omitted, emphasis
added); 8 Am. Jur.2d, Bailments

§ 136; 8 C.J.S., Bailments

§

47.
Indeed, this Court has already noted, that in this
case, a finding that a bailee was negligence would be
necessary before the bailee could be liable for damage to
the bailed chattel —

again showing that the bailee is under

obligation to insure the property.
at 3, citing

Decision in First Appeal

Sumsion, 132 P.2d at 685-86; Barlow Upholstery

& Furniture v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900, 901 (Utah 1975).
Given that Brown was not party to any express agreement
concerning insurance on the airplane and that the courts
will not obligate a bailee to insure the bailed property,
Brown had no duty to insure the airplane.

Similarly, the

evidence in this case and the prior ruling in the trial
court require that if a bailment exists in this case, it can
be only an implied bailment.

Because the courts will not

require the bailee to insure the bailed property absent an
express agreement, Brown owed no duty to Diumenti to insure
his airplane.

The Utah Supreme Court's further analysis in

Sumsion confirms this conclusion:

"[T]he plaintiff's

evidence failed to prove an express insurer's contract, and
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as we have seen from the above authorities the law will not
imply one."

Sumsion. 132 P.2d at 686.

III. Assuming that a Bailment Existed Between Diumenti and
Brown, Brown is Not Liable for Damages to the Airplane
Pursuant to this Agreement Because He Was Not Negligent in
His Operation of the Aircraft.
A. Before A Bailee Is Liable For Damages To the Bailed
Object, there Must Be a Finding Of Negligence and Proximate
Cause.
As this Court already noted in its previous decision in
this case, "negligence . . . is the basis for liability in a
cause of action for bailment."
3, citing

Decision in First Appeal at

Sumsion, 132 P.2d at 685-86; Barlow Upholstery,

533 P.2d at 901 (a "bailee has a duty to exercise reasonable
care and caution commensurate with acceptance of the responsibility of safekeeping the property of others entrusted to
him").

Because negligence is an essential part of a plain-

tiff's case, she "has the ultimate burden of proof on this
issue."

Sumsion 132 P.2d at 686.

If a plaintiff can show

that a bailment exists and show that the bailed goods were
returned in a damaged condition, he has made a prima facie
case for negligence.

Id.

Further, when a prima facie case

is made and when the bailee had exclusive possession of the
bailed property, the defendant must establish that she
exercised due care in her handling of the bailed property to
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avoid liability.

Id.

This presumption rests on the

practical consideration that when the bailee is in exclusive
possession of the property, he has a better opportunity to
establish the cause of the damage.

Id. at 687.

However, "the cases almost universally hold that this
inference of negligence will not arise in those cases where
the bailor . . . had the same opportunity to ascertain the
facts as the bailee."

Id.

In any case, the ultimate burden

of establishing negligence rests on the plaintiff.

Romey v.

Covey Garage, 111 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1941) ("If considering
the evidence on both sides the jury is not persuaded that
negligence by bailee either did or did not exist, then it
must find for bailee (defendant), because on bailor (plaintiff) rests the burden of proving negligence").
A plaintiff cannot rest on a prima facie case of negligence if the defendant presents evidence that she was not
negligent.

Staheli v. Farmers' Co-Op of Southern Utah, 655

P.2d 680, 683 fn. 1 (Utah 1982) ("[i]f the bailee proves due
care, and the bailor relies on nothing more than the presumption, a directed verdict in bailee,s favor would be
appropriate").

In such a situation, a plaintiff still bears

the burden of proving that the defendant (bailee) was
negligent.

Id.
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In addition, there must be a finding that the bailee's
negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to the
bailed chattel•

For example, in Sumsion, the Utah Supreme

Court concluded that because there was no evidence that the
bailee's negligence was the proximate cause of a subsequent
automobile accident, the bailee was not liable for the
damages which occurred to the bailors' car.

Sumsion, 132

P.2d at 687. The Court arrived at this conclusion despite
evidence that the driver of tow truck failed to signal
before entering on to an icy road.

Id. at 682. Although a

coal truck hit plaintiffs' car almost immediately after the
tow truck driver pulled away from the curb towing plaintiffs' car, the court found that no link had been
established between the failure to signal and the subsequent
accident.

Id.; see also,

Staheli, 655 P.2d 680, 684

("[w]hen the proximate cause of an injury is left to
speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law"); Carey v.
Waliner, 744 P.2d 881 (Mont. 1987) (defendant (bailee) not
liable for damage to tractor where cause of damage could not
be determined).
On the basis of the rules which govern a cause of
action in bailment and the evidence produced at trial, Brown
is not liable for the damages to Diumenti's airplane.
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First, the trial court made no findings or conclusions that
Brown failed to exercise due care in his operation of the
aircraft.

Second, Brown testified at length and the trial

court agreed, that he exercised all due care while flying
and attempting to land the airplane.

Finally, in response

to this evidence, Diumenti was unable to offer any evidence
to show either that Brown was negligent or that Brown's
conduct was the proximate cause of the damage to the
airplane.

Essentially, Diumenti has left to speculation,

the cause of the damage to his airplane.

Because none of

the elements necessary for assigning liability to Brown have
been meet, Brown cannot be held liable.

B. The Trial Court Made No Finding That Brown Was Negligent
or that His Conduct Was the Proximate Cause Of the Damage To
the Airplane.
Already this Court emphasized that the trial court "did
not make any findings or conclusions concerning negligence,
which is the basis for liability in a cause of action for
bailment."

Decision in First Appeal at 3 (citations omit-

ted) . Despite this requirement, the trial court found Brown
liable on the basis of bailment without making any findings
or conclusions concerning negligence.

Because the trial

court has not complied with the requirements mandated by
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this Court for finding Brown liable for damage to the
airplane, the trial court made a fatal error in its assignment of liability to Brown.

As this Court has already

noted, without a factual finding or legal conclusion that
Brown was negligent, he cannot be held labile for damage to
the airplane.

C. At Trial, Brown Established that He Exercised All Due
Care In His Operation Of the Aircraft.
The trial court made no finding that Brown failed to
exercise due care in his operation of the airplane because
it could not.

The evidence at trial confirmed that Brown

completely fulfilled his duty to exercise reasonable care
while he flew and landed the airplane.
Brown relied on over four thousand (4,000) hours of
flight time in the Air Force, (Primary Trial Transcript at
9), in addition to four (4) years of commercial flying
experience when he flew the airplane.

Id. at 7.

Brown was

familiar with the controls and operation of the airplane
before the accident.

When he flew the airplane to Idaho as

a copilot, he made several partial landings of the aircraft
which required Brown to operate the landing gear three or
four times.

Id. at 60. Before the accident, Brown also

took forty-five (45) minutes on a couple occasions to
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familiarize himself with the controls of the airplane.

Id.

at 18-19.
At trial, Brown also explained the prelanding checklist
that he utilized to prepare for landing the airplane just
before the accident.

Primary Trial Transcript at 210-212.

In response to Ritter's landing gear challenge, Brown
lowered the gear with the proper lever, saw the lowered nose
gear in an exterior mirror designed for this purpose, felt
the initial buffet that occurs when the gear is lowered and
saw the light that indicates that the gear is lowered and
locked.

Id. at 211.

A few miles from the airport, Ritter again made the
landing gear challenge and Brown again checked that the
handle was in the down position, looked at the extended nose
gear in the mirror and saw that the gear-down light was on,
before he responded that the gear was down and locked.
at 212-213.

Id.

From the time that the landing gear was lowered

and locked, Brown and Ritter continued to feel a drag that
occurs when the landing gear is locked into the down
position.

Id.

Finally, Brown testified that after the

crash, but before leaving the airplane, he checked and
determined that the landing gear lever was still in the down
position.

Id.

at 216.
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The testimony of Ritter fully collaborates Brown's
testimony that the landing gear was indeed down and locked
when the airplane approached the runway and that Brown, as
pilot, followed all standard procedures to land the airplane
properly.

Id. at 95 & 97. Paul Johnson, another exper-

ienced pilot, testified that once while piloting Diumenti's
airplane, he had experienced a problem with the landing
gear, fid, at 185), and twice had the engines quit on him
upon landing the aircraft.

Id. at 188.

Clearly, Brown has proven that he was not negligent in
his operation of the airplane.

By all accounts, Brown was

extremely thorough and careful both in his flying and
preparation to land the aircraft.

On the basis of the

evidence, Brown has readily met the burden of overcoming any
presumption that he was negligent in the operation of the
aircraft.

Because Brown was not negligent, he cannot be

liable for any damage to the airplane.9
9

While Brown has proven that he was not negligent in
his operation of the airplane, he does not have the burden
of showing that he was not at fault. Because the trial
court made no finding that the airplane was in Brown's
exclusive possession before the May 9 flight, the presumption of Brown's negligence — based on the damage of the
aircraft — cannot be made.
The evidence also shows that Brown was not in exclusive
possession of the airplane. Before the accident, neither
Ritter nor Brown had the keys to the airplane. Primary
Trial Transcript at 148 & 208. During this time, the
36

D. At Trial, Diumenti Did Not Provide Any Evidence To
Establish that Brown Was Negligent In His Operation Of the
Aircraft.
As established above, a plaintiff (bailor) has the
ultimate burden of showing that the defendant (bailee) was
negligent.

Romey, 111 P.2d at 547. When the bailee has

responded to a prima facie presumption of negligence by
showing that she was not at fault, the plaintiff must offer
evidence to counter the defendants contention that she
acted reasonably.

Staheli, 655 P.2d at 683, fn.l. Other-

wise, the bailee is cleared of any liability for damage to
the bailed property.

Id.

In addition, if a plaintiff is

able to establish negligence, he must also show that this
negligence was the proximate cause of any damage to the
bailed property.

Sumsion, 132 P.2d at 687. Because

Diumenti has not provided any evidence which casts doubt on
the reasonableness of Brown's operation of the aircraft or
aircraft was sometimes parked on the ramp at the Salt Lake
Airport and was sometimes gone from that location. Id.
Finally, there is no evidence that the airplane was in
good working order before the May 9 flight. Diumenti also
has obligations under any alleged bailment contract. As the
bailor, he has an obligation "that the thing or property
bailed for use shall be reasonably fit for the purposes or
capable of the use known or intended.11 Aircraft Sales &
Service v. Gantt, 52 So.2d 388, 391 (Ala. 1951) (citations
omitted). lf[I]f the use of the instrumentality threatens
serious danger to others unless it is in good condition,
there is a duty to take reasonable care to ascertain its
condition by inspection." Id. (citations omitted).
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that Brown , s conduct was the proximate cause of the damage
to the airplane, Diumenti cannot sustain his damage claim
against Brown.
Diumenti has provided no evidence that Brown failed to
exercise due care.

None of the witnesses testifying at

trial would even speculate as to the cause of the accident.
No witness was called or evidence presented which pointed to
any error or failure on the part of Brown.

Instead, the

testimony was limited to assertions that the landing gear on
airplanes, in general, and the particular airplane at issue,
usually functions properly.

Importantly, Diumenti has

merely speculated on the cause of the damage to his
airplane, offering no real proof as to the cause of the
accident.
Diumenti's first witness, Donald Magnuson, the FAA
official who was required by law to investigate this
accident, testified his report of the accident contained no
opinion as to the causes of the accident.
Transcript at 67.

Primary Trial

While the landing gear was retracted when

Magnuson inspected the airplane and he later tested the gear
(without the weight of the airplane on it) and found it
functioning, Magnuson refuse to make any suggestions
concerning what (or who) caused the accident or whether the
38

landing gear was functioning properly when the airplane
attempted to land.

Id.

at 62-72.

Ron Nelson, an experienced pilot did not see the
airplane after the accident.

Id. at 243.

He too was also

unable to speculate on the cause of the accident.
239.

Id. at

Allen Woodhouse, who helped repair the airplane after

the accident, testified that according to his experience,
there is no way to raise the landing gear except with the
lever intended for that function.

Id. at 256. However,

Woodhouse also was unable to speculate on the cause of the
accident.

Id. at 247-256.

This evidence does not erode the conclusion that Brown
completely fulfilled his duty of care in operating the
airplane.

No one could determine the cause of the accident

and no one could point to any instance where Brown failed to
exercise due care in his operation of the airplane.

As a

result, the evidence that Brown was without fault stands
unchallenged•
Indeed, the trial court apparently agreed, remarking at
the close of Diumenti's case that
[t]here's no testimony that they [Ritter and
Brown] failed to do anything. The testimony as I
understand it and the state of the evidence is
simply that the aircraft crashed because the
landing gear was not in the down position —
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either was not in a down position or was in the
down position and collapsed.
Primary Trial Transcript at 75. Where the evidence leaves
to conjecture the cause of an injury, where there is more
than one probable cause why the injury occurred, no recovery
can be had.

Sumsion, 132 P.2d at 683.

"While deduction may

be based on probabilities, the evidence must do more than
merely raise a conjecture or show a probability."
at 683.

Sumsion

Because Diumenti has done nothing more than raise

the possibility that the accident could have been caused by
Brown's negligence, but has done nothing to prove this
conjecture, Diumenti is not entitled to recover from Brown.
Id.10

IV. Diumenti's Cause of Action Against Brown For Negligence
Should Be Dismissed Because There Was No Evidence At Trial
That Brown Was Negligent In His Operation Of The Airplane.
Unlike under a bailment theory, a plaintiff, proceeding
under on the basis of ordinary negligence, has the entire
burden of showing that the defendant was at fault —

there

is no presumption of negligence in a routine cause of action
for failure to exercise due care.

10

For the reasons stated

Importantly, Diumenti also failed to show that
Brown's conduct — much less his negligent conduct — was
the proximate cause of the accident.
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above, that, (1) Brown proved that he was not negligent in
his operation of the aircraft; (2) Diumenti offered no
evidence to counter Brown,s demonstration that he exercised
due care; and, (3) Diumenti has left to speculation, the
cause of the damage to his airplane, this Court should
dismiss Diumenti7s negligence cause of action against Brown.
To avoid subjecting Brown to further meritless litigation in
this case, this court should conclude that Diumenti was
unable to prove that Brown was negligent or that Brown's
actions were the cause of the damage to the airplane.

CONCLUSION
On the basis of the arguments above and the evidence in
this case, this Court should find that Brown is not liable
for the damage to Diumenti7s airplane.
On the basis of the trial court's early dismissal of
Diumenti's contract claim against Brown and the evidence at
trial, this court should determine that no expressed or
implied bailment existed between Diumenti and Brown.

All

agreements concerning the airplane were between only
Diumenti and Ritter.
However, even if Brown were party to a bailment, this
Court should refuse to find Brown liable for damages to the
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airplane on the basis of this agreement.

Brown could not be

liable on any express insurance agreement in connection with
bailment because the trial court already determined that he
was never party to any express agreement.

Furthermore, in

the absence of express terms, Brown had no duty to insure
the airplane.

Thus, without a finding of negligence —

the trial court made no such finding —

and

Brown cannot liable

for the damages to the airplane.
Finally, this Court should determine that because the
evidence shows that Brown exercised all reasonable care in
his operation of the aircraft, he can not be liable for
damage to the plane.

For his bailment claim, Diumenti

offered no evidence to counter the ample proof that Brown
exercised due care in his flying of the airplane.

Diumenti

has merely speculated as to the cause of the accident and
has offered no proof that Brown7s conduct was the proximate
cause of the ill fated landing.

As a result, Diumenti

cannot require that Brown pay for the damage to the airplane
on the basis of either bailment or negligence.

Brown ful-

filled all his legal responsibilities to Diumenti
Diumenti cannot seek compensation from Brown.
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—

Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's
ruling below and should order dismissal of all of Diumenti's
claims against Brown with prejudice.
DATED this 11th day of April, 1994.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Brown
Appellant/Defendant
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MARSHALED FACTS RE: EXPRESS AGREEMENT
CONCERNING INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
DEFENDANT LARRY BROWN'S
USE OF DIUMENTI'S AIRPLANE
Transcript of April 4 and 5, 1989
Page

Line

Subject

TESTIMONY OF BROWN
8

14-15

1974-80: pattern of leasing, renting, borrowing
airplanes; "whatever was needed, not on a particular
basis."

8

22-23

Sometimes it would be more than a year between
flights.

9

10

Averaged less than 20 hours a year.

10-12
15

13-14

General pattern of leasing planes for business.
Diumenti required Brown to co-pilot an instruction
trip from Salt Lake City to Pocatello; Brown received
instruction on basic maneuvers, particularly landing
the Cessna 414.

15

22

Brown landed the plane three or four times at
Pocatello.

24

22

During "1980 to 1984" leased six or eight aircraft,
possibly more.

25

1

Mercury Air Courier Service was the lessee.

25

17-18

Brown was not usually involved in negotiating leases;
that was primarily Ritter's job.

25

21

The leases were "absolutely written always."

26

24-25

Brown assumed there was insurance covering him on the
"training" flight from SLC to Pocatello; he assumed
the primary pilot (the instructor pilot) was covered
by insurance.

33

12

Brown had no contact with the plaintiffs concerning
leasing their aircraft on May 9, the day of the
accident.

33

15

Brown did not speak with Diumenti in May about using
the aircraft.

34

11-24

Brown did speak with Diumenti twice in April "to
explore the possibility of using his aircraft."

35

15-22

Brown and Diumenti spoke "only in the most general
terms" about use of the aircraft, its capabilities,
Brown's experience, Ritter's experience, insurance,
possible location of the aircraft, hangaring, and
terms of a lease arrangement.

Brown and Diumenti discussed Mercury Courier's written
leases, about negotiating a price for the use of the
aircraft.
Brown and Diumenti specifically discussed getting a
waiver for Brown for coverage under Diumenti's
insurance because Brown did not meet the open pilot
clause on the insurance policy which Diumenti had.
Brown and Ritter showed Diumenti what their insurance
policies looked like.
Brown did not enter a written lease agreement with
Diumenti at that time.
No lease was entered because the details had not been
worked out; they had not gotten to the point where any
of the necessary arrangements had been made.
Mercury Air Courier (MAC) was leasing other aircraft.
Those aircraft were insured.
MAC had no aircraft at that time where the lessor was
insuring the aircraft.
MAC did not intend to insure Diumenti's aircraft
because
there were different needs and uses involved; Diumenti
wanted to use his pilots, and MAC'S policy could not
have accommodated that.
the next time Brown had any conversation with Diumenti
was when they were getting into the airplane to fly to
Pocatello.
Brown's discussions with Ritter focused on the
mechanical status of the airplane.
As of May 9, 1984, the date the plane was damaged,
Brown's understanding was that the plane was not under
a lease.
Brown understood the plane was being used for purposes
of checking it out, weighing it, "that sort of thing."
A mechanic employed and paid by MAC removed the
propellers for repair. He was not paid by Diumenti.
MAC paid for the repair work.
Brown "knew" all MAC'S leases were written because he
believed he saw all of them; Ritter would say the
lease had been prepared; also he believed he had a
copy of each of them.
Brown did not execute any of the leases.
MAC was responsible for insurance for all the other
planes it leased.

ii

52

52

1

12-16

Brown knew that the meeting with Diumenti at Ritter's
home was about an aircraft. He did not know Diumenti
and he did not know about the plane.
Brown was introduced to Diumenti as the chief pilot
for, specifically, Mercury Air Courier Service.

52

22

53

2

53

14-20

53

22-23

The conversation was in general terms.
There was no specific agreement reached as to use of
the airplane.
There was specific discussion about getting an
insurance waiver for Brown; Diumenti said he had
already done so for another pilot with far less
experience than Brown, and that he saw no reason why
he couldn't get insurance for Brown.
Brown's understanding was that Diumenti would take
care of insurance.

54

1

Brown does not believe that entering a formal lease
was a contingency for Diumenti getting Brown insured.

54

7-12

55

1

55

10

After the training flight to Pocatello, there was no
conditional, specific agreement entered into with
Diumenti.

55

15

Brown engaged in no negotiations regarding leasing the
plane during that flight to Pocatello.

55

18

That was the only other occasion Brown had any contact
with Diumenti.

55

22

Brown had no further contact with any agents or
individuals who indicated they were acting on behalf
of Diumenti or the owner of the plane.

56

3

Brown did not make the arrangements for the propeller
to be repaired; Ritter made the arrangements and paid
for them.

57

6

Brown had no additional understanding of any agreement

The only agreement resulting from that meeting was
that Brown would go along on a flight to be checked
out.
Brown was not aware of any further agreements being
reached between Diumenti, Ritter, Brown or any entity
regarding the plane.

with the owners regarding use of the airplane.
57

9

Brown had seen no written lease.

57

11

Brown had seen no draft of a lease.

57

14-20

57

23-25

Brown had discussed with Ritter the potential terms of
a written lease.
MAC'S leases were not all identical; the terms were
customized for each transaction.
iii

9

Ritter had told Brown that a lease had not been
entered into regarding the Cessna 414.

4-5

On May 9, the
Brown knew of
the owners of
"for purposes

8-18

Brown was instructed by Ritter to fly the aircraft to
Tooele, refuel it, fly it to Logan to be weighed and
return to SLC. There were no additional instructions.

21
1-3

date of the flight from SLC to Tooele,
no further understanding reached with
the plane regarding use of the plane,
of Mercury Air Courier Service."

Brown had no permission directly from the owners to
use the plane on May 9th.
Brown had no understanding of any specific agreement
beyond the "vague discussion" at Ritter's house.

OF DIUMENTI (PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT)
8-16

17-21

Ritter contacted Diumenti and expressed interest in
leasing the Cessna 414. Diumenti said he would ask
his partner and get back to Ritter.
Diumenti called Ritter back on April 27; he said they
were interested in leasing the aircraft.

2-5

The purpose of the meeting at Ritter's home was to
review the aircraft and the owners' willingness to
lease, also to learn more about Ritter and his
intended use.

6-13

Diumenti understood that Ritter was representing
himself; there was no representation about any third
party being involved.

16-24

Diumenti took several documents to the meeting; among
them were the current INA insurance contract; and "an
outline of the basis upon which Mr. Allred was trying
to fathom a partnership would be willing to lease the
aircraft."

10-13

Brown was introduced to Diumenti as an individual; the
individual who would fly the airplane for Ritter's
purposes under a potential lease.

2-3

Ritter had two basic purposes for a potential lease:
cargo and humans. Diumenti, Ritter and Brown discussed
these purposes.

6-12

Specific terms of a leasing arrangement were discussed
that evening by Diumenti, Ritter and Brown.

15-20

There were no negotiations. Diumenti told Ritter and
Brown under what terms he and his partner would be
interested in leasing the plane.

23

Diumenti understood that an agreement was reached at
that meeting.

iv

10

1-24

Diumenti understood that Ritter would lease the plane
under the following terms:
Ritter and the partnership with ownership interest in
the plane would share, pro rata, the costs of taxes,
costs, maintenance, and fees based on the number of
hours that each used the plane. Each party would pay
their own fuel & oil. cost of repairs would be
allocated ad hoc. Ritter would pay $100 per hour for
use of the aircraft.

11

2-8

Terms relative to insuring the plane were discussed.
The open pilot warranty in Diumenti's insurance was
discussed.

11

18-25

Under the pilot provision, the insurance company would
waive a pilot who had years of experience on a particular aircraft. Brown had many more hours of flying
experience than pilots the insurance company had
already waived (but not in the Cessna 414).

11
12

251

A significant part of the evening was centered around
discussing insurance.

12

2-6

Brown and Ritter said they knew Diumenti's insurance
broker and that "if the matter were consummated" Brown
would immediately get with the broker to get the
necessary waivers to be added to the policy.

14

16-24

The obtaining of coverage for Brown was specifically
discussed on Sunday, April 29. The substance of the
discussion was "essentially, that should the
transaction be consummated," that Ritter and Brown
would seek open pilot insurance waiver for Brown.

15

12-17

Diumenti's understanding was that no additional
premium would be required by the insurance company to
add Brown to the policy; Diumenti had no discussion
with Brown or Ritter concerning additional premiums.

15

21-24

Diumenti recalls
Ritter obtaining
discussion would
Diumenti and his

no discussion concerning Brown and
their own insurance coverage. Such a
have been contrary to the desires of
partner.

16

4

Diumenti believed he had a specific understanding with
Ritter and Brown about how the airplane would be
insured if they were to use the airplane.

16

8-13

Diumenti understood that waiver on his policy was "the
minimum that would be expected of them and required."
He added that "should they be engaged in services or
transactions that weren't covered by our policy, they
would obtain insurance for those situations."

18

4

The agreement Diumenti understood he had reached with
Ritter and Brown was not modified or changed prior to
the flight to Pocatello; that flight took place the
very next morning.

v

18

11-21

There were two purposes for the April 30th flight to
Pocatello: Diumenti had business to transact, and
Diumenti had arranged for an instructor pilot to fly
the plane so that "Brown could get the required number
of take-offs and landings prior to their taking
possession of the airplane and making use of it."

19

20-22

Diumenti had no other conversations with Ritter or
Brown that modified his understanding of what the
agreement was.

19
20

24-25
1-17

Ritter, Brown and Diumenti arranged that MAC would
repair the propeller. They agreed Ritter would get a
credit on the $100/hour, they would pay to get the
propeller repaired, and miscellaneous adjustments
would be made to credit them for the cost of such
repair. Diumenti was told MAC could get it done more
cheaply than he could because MAC was "in the
business."

20

24-25

Typically, the pilot of the plane would make
arrangements for any repairs found necessary.

21

9

Ritter made the arrangements for the propeller to be
repaired.

21

12

Diumenti had several conversations with Ritter between
April 30th (Pocatello flight) and May 9 (Tooele
flight).

21

14-25

On May 9 they discussed the incident at Tooele
airport; on May 3, 1984, Ritter informed Diumenti of
the nature of and arrangements for repairs to the
propeller, "and that they would be using the aircraft
as we had agreed prior to May 1st."

30

21

The "outline" referred to at p. 7, is something
Diumenti prepared and took to the April 29 meeting.

31

2-24

Diumenti has not found a copy of the outline.

32
32

9
21-23

Diumenti has not asked Ritter or Brown for a copy.
The outline "essentially described the bases upon
which Triangle Travel (the partnership of Diumenti and
Allred) would be willing to lease the aircraft."

32
33

251

The outline did not contain a $100/hour rate; that was
discussed at the meeting.

33

5

The discussions at the meeting at Ritter's home were
predominately with Ritter.

33

9-10

Diumenti understood that Ritter was the lessee.

33

15-21

Diumenti recalls testifying earlier that "the basis
upon which Triangle Travel was willing to lease the
aircraft" was that Ritter's pilot (Brown) "would be
added to our policy and that any use beyond the use
prescribed in the policy ... would be a use insured by
them, if it were not already insured in the policy."
VI

34
35

22-25
1-10

36

1-2

36

15-18

42

8

Diumenti testified at his deposition that "Ritter and
Brown could carry the insurance ... "
Diumenti never had a telephone conversation with
Brown.
Diumenti understood that the terms of the lease were
finalized on Sunday, April 28 (?), 1984, subject to
only two things: Brown's inspection and check-out in
the aircraft and the obtaining of insurance.
The name of Mercury Air Courier Service did not come
up in Diumenti's first conversation with Ritter.

42

11

No "agency" was disclosed by Ritter to Diumenti.

43

4

43

15

43

19

Ritter did not intimate in any way that he was acting
on behalf of any other corporate or business entity.

43

22-23

The same is true for the May 3 phone call.

44

2-5

Diumenti believes that the first time he heard of MAC
was the day of the crash or sometime in the week after
the crash.

44

9

Diumenti was never asked to allow the aircraft to be
used by anyone other than Ritter and Brown.

44

13

Diumenti was never asked to allow the aircraft to be
used by a business entity called Mercury Air Courier
Services.

44

17

Diumenti had never asked for information regarding
MAC.

45

11

Diumenti was not given any documents with the name
Mercury Air Courier Services on them.

45

15-17

One of the two conditions which weren't taken care of
on Sunday was that Ritter wanted Brown to inspect the
plane, fly it ...

46

1-6

Ritter called Diumenti on May 1, indicated that the
plane was fine, he wanted it, Brown liked it, and
discussed the propeller problem - specifically that
arrangements would be made to fix it, and that Ritter
could get it done more cheaply than Diumenti.

46

17-19

Diumenti would not have allowed the repairs to be done
by Ritter if he had not believed there was an
agreement.

46

23-24

It was Diumenti's understanding after speaking with
Ritter on May 1 that the deal was consummated.

47

2-5

Ritter did not indicate he was acting on behalf of the
business entity in the April 27 phone call.
Ritter did not indicate he was acting on behalf of MAC
in the May 1 phone call*

Diumenti spoke with Ritter on the 1st and the 3rd
vii

about insurance. Ritter told Diumenti on the 3rd that
he had not "heard back" from the insurance broker.
47

9

Ritter did not indicate to Diumenti that he was not
going to get a waiver for Brown.

47

12-13
& 19

Diumenti did not envision a written agreement
with Ritter.

47

22

There was no discussion on April 29 about a written
contract.

47

25

Ritter and Brown did not show Diumenti any sort of
forms or written agreements.

49

10-20

Diumenti believed that the terms of the deal were
certain when he left Ritter's home on April 29 (?),
subject only to inspection of the aircraft and Brown
being added to the insurance policy. On May 1, Ritter
acknowledged that Brown liked the aircraft, that there
was a problem with the propeller, and that they were
willing "to go ahead, have the thing fixed at their
expense and credit it to the $100 per hour that would
inure in the future."

49

25

On May 1, Ritter called and said "'Mr. Brown likes the

50

1-5

aircraft, the problem with the propeller he's
discussed with me, we're going to go ahead and have
that fixed; we can get it done cheaper than you. I'll
be back with you directly if there's any other
problems that the mechanics find.' That was said on
May 1st."

50

8-9

Diumenti believed that on Sunday, April 27 (?) they
had "an oral agreement subject to a condition
subsequent."

50

14

Diumenti believed that on May 1st the conditions were
performed and, at least, the lease was not refuted.

50

20-21

At the April 29 (?) meeting at Ritter's, Brown
represented that he would be the only pilot flying the
plane, after being added to the policy.

50

25

Brown made no other representations.

51

3-6

Brown said he understood what he had to do to get a
waiver on the policy; he did not say he would go and
get insurance coverage.

51

16-20

Diumenti told Brown on April 30 that he didn't expect
the airplane to go anywhere until there was insurance.

52

21-22

Diumenti's understanding was that the lease was (to
be) between Triangle Travel and Ritter, not Brown.

53

6-10

As of May 3, Diumenti "understood" that Ritter or
Brown had already contacted the insurance broker; on
the 3rd he asked Ritter whether they had heard back.

viii

55

11-14

Diumenti testified in deposition that he specifically
did not recall asking about insurance for Brown in the
phone call of May 3.

56

1-5

57

15-18

Diumenti's memory "is thoroughly refreshed as to the
subject matter of the conversations" he had with
Ritter because he chronologies his calls, and reflects
on the transaction ..•

57

21

There is nothing in the phone message that says
anything about insurance.

Diumenti has refreshed his recollection since the
deposition by reviewing his telephone logs; his
recollection is "much clearer and more concise today
than it was in August."

TESTIMONY OF RITTER
78

11-16

Ritter and Brown met with Diumenti because they were
interested in negotiating a lease for his Cessna; they
wanted to find out about the aircraft.

79

21-25

Diumenti was adamant that the aircraft be insured
under Diumenti's policy.

80

17

Ritter showed Diumenti Ritter's insurance policy.

80

21

80

25

The policy was in the name Mercury Air Courier
Service.
There was much discussion at the meeting about Brown's
qualifications and experience and qualifying under
Diumenti's insurance policy.

81

18

Diumenti indicated he was going to "take care of"
getting a waiver for Brown on Diumenti's policy.

81

25

Brown did not at any time say that he would "take care
of" getting waived onto Diumenti's insurance.

82

4-16

82
83

19-25

There was extensive discussion of Mercury Air Courier;
that there were three corporations.
Ritter discussed the functions of the corporations.

1-4

83

8

At the end of the meeting, Ritter did not understand
that a lease had been finalized.

83

12

An hourly rate for leasing the plane was not decided
upon during the meeting.

83

23

There were significant additional terms to be
negotiated on the potential lease.

84

2-5

The only oral leases MAC had on airplanes were with
FNB Leasing, because of the commonality of ownership.
All other leases were written.

84

9-20

Terms which were not agreed upon: price per flying
IX

hour, whether there would be minimum hours per month,
reserve requirements, where the aircraft would be
hangared, whether the aircraft would be able to be
flown Part 135 of the FAR.
The FAA would have had to approve the airplane and
"make and model" operation under Part 135.
These terms were never resolved and agreed upon.
Ritter never talked with Diumenti about contacting the
insurance broker.
A written lease agreement was never drafted regarding
the Cessna 414 because negotiations never got that
far.
Ritter and Brown did discuss "written terms of the
lease agreement."
The night they met with Diumenti, Ritter and Brown had
an opportunity to review the terms and conditions of
Diumenti's insurance policy.
Ritter thought it was the insurance broker's father
who had the insurance agency.
Diumenti's insurance policy had common boilerplate
provisions.
The open pilot provision required significantly
greater hours than MAC'S policy.
Ritter understood that Diumenti would "take care of"
getting Brown warrantied under Diumenti's insurance
policy.
Ritter figured, since Diumenti was a lawyer - he knew
how to "take care of it."
Every other pilot with MAC was covered under MAC'S
insurance policy.
Ritter did not see "the outline" at the meeting; he
does not accept that Diumenti brought all the
documents he says he did; he only saw an equipment
list and insurance policy.
Ritter took MAC'S insurance policy to the meeting with
Diumenti.
Ritter disputes Diumenti's testimony that $100/hr had
been agreed upon.
Ritter was intending to prepare a written lease for
the airplane.
Ritter never began a draft of a written lease.
Ritter did not begin to draft a lease because they
"weren't that close to leasing the airplane,"

x

128

14

Ritter does not specifically remember letting Diumenti
examine the MAC insurance policy.

128

24

It is possible that Ritter simply discussed the policy
with Diumenti.

131

3-4

All the aircraft leased by MAC from lessors other than
FBN were under written leases.

131

13

132

6

132

14

At the end of April, beginning of May, all MAC
aircraft were insured for their pilots and for their
use.

132

19

Aircraft insurance covers not only the pilots but also
the use to which the aircraft is put.

133

3

It was company policy to have insurance coverage for
both use and pilot on all MAC'S aircraft.

133

7

It was policy for MAC to obtain that insurance.

135

9

At the time the propeller repairs were undertaken,
Ritter did not believe he had an agreement with
Diumenti regarding the Cessna 414.

135

13-15

It was company policy to have written leases on all
its aircraft.
Ritter, as a lawyer, recognized the need for a written
lease to determine responsibilities of the parties.

Ritter had permission from Diumenti to fix the plane.

136

3

Ritter did not believe he would be at any risk if he
did the repairs and then did not lease the plane.

136
137

8-25
1-24

Ritter was familiar with the requirements of his
insurance company for adding a new pilot; his policy
provided "two-stage coverage." All he had to do was
call with the name of a pilot and the pilot would be
added to the policy. Then follow-up paperwork would be
completed to verify qualifications.

138

8

Ritter's testimony, as opposed to Diumenti's, is that
Diumenti agreed to get Brown covered.

138

16

Brown gave Diumenti information about his
qualifications for purposes of Diumenti's getting
Brown covered on Diumenti's insurance.

138

18-22

Brown told Diumenti that he was a retired Air Force
pilot, that the had so many thousand hours total time,
that he had multi-engine experience, but no experience
in the 414.

139

1

Ritter believed that Diumenti had all he needed to get
Brown covered on the policy.

139

7

Diumenti indicated to Ritter and Brown that he had all
he needed.

xi

Getting the aircraft weighed was a condition precedent
to the effectiveness of a lease agreement; the plane
was not airworthy Part 135 without it,
Ritter expected that the plane would pass the weight
check.
Following the weight check and the propeller repair,
there still needed to be a prelease inspection by
MAC'S mechanic.
Ritter would have understood that he was going to
"take this aircraft and use it in connection with this
new flight service" after the prelease inspection;
"assuming that the open items could have been
satisfactorily resolved."
Ritter intended to use the aircraft; that is why he
was taking it for weighing.
Ritter did not think about the issue of insurance when
he knew Brown was going to fly the Cessna to Logan.
Ritter did not stop to reflect on company policy of
insuring all aircraft before using them.
Ritter did not think what might happen to the aircraft
while it was in his possession, and who would pay for
the damage.
Ritter did not bill Diumenti for the propeller repairs
after the incident at Tooele.
Ritter did testify that he thought that if he didn't
lease the aircraft, that those repairs would be paid
for by Diumenti.
Brown was an employee of MAC on May 9, 1984; he was
not in the personal employ of Ritter.
MAC received approval to fly passengers between SLC
and Logan toward the end of the summer of 1984.
As of April 30, 1984 & May 9, 1984, MAC had no use for
a passenger aircraft.
Between April 29 and May 9, Ritter did not have the
keys to the Cessna 414.
Ritter does not know if Brown had the keys.
MAC would not have been able to fly passengers in the
Cessna without a F.A.R. 135 certificate.
The Cessna was never leased by MAC from Diumenti.
Ritter did not reflect on the issue of insurance on
May 9 because it was Diumenti's airplane, they had
permission to fly it, they were doing Diumenti a favor
in taking it for weighing, so that it could be leased.

xii

156

9-11

Ritter believes that Diumenti hired MAC to get the
propeller fixed and the airplane weighed.

157

13

Ritter did not speak to Diumenti directly about
repairing the propeller; he exchanged messages through
Diumenti's office personnel and understood that he had
been retained to have those services done.

158

5

158

11

159

7

161

17

Ritter knew that for Brown to fly the airplane, an
insurance waiver was required.

161

25

Diumenti's insurance would not cover commercial
passenger transport..

162

3

Diumenti's insurance would not cover the F.A.R. part
135 use.

162

9

Additional insurance would have been required for MAC
to use the airplane for that use.

162

15

Ritter undertook the repairs pursuant to what he
thought was an agreement with Diumenti.
Ritter undertook to fly the plane for the weigh-in
pursuant to what he understood to be an agreement
based upon those telephone conversations.
Diumenti never conveyed to Ritter that he had obtained
insurance waiver for Brown.

When the aircraft took off from SLC on May 9, Brown
was operating it.

TESTIMONY OF COLLEEN RITTER
199

25

Ms. Ritter was directly present in the same room with
Diumenti probably half the time the meeting lasted.

201

6-9

There were never any terms of a lease agreement that
finalized; nothing was ever firmed up.

201

12-20

Diumenti was emphatic that he would take care of the
insurance; he said it would not be a problem and that
he would take care of getting the waiver.

201

22-25

The resolution of the meeting was that Ritter and
Brown wanted to check over the plane, see if it met
the part 135 qualifications, that they would stay in
touch with Diumenti, and that Diumenti would take care
of preparing the lease when it was ready.

202

202

9

12-18

It was not Ms. Ritter's understanding the Ritter or
Brown would fly the airplane until Diumenti presented
a lease.
Ritter and Brown were going to determine whether the
plane met the 135 qualifications; Diumenti explained
that he had a case in Idaho, and he invited Brown to
go along to get checked out, and that his pilot would
give Brown some training on the plane while Diumenti
presented his case.
xiii

202

21

203

16-18

There was no other discussion about any other flights
in thfe airplane.
Diumenti was emphatic that whoever flew that plane
would be covered by Diumenti's insurance.

TESTIMONY OF BROWN
206

20-25

Diumenti wanted Brown covered on Diumenti's policy
because his policy allowed a continuous listing of
pilots that would have been difficult to do with MAC'S
policy.

207

4-6

There was discussion at the meeting at Ritter's house
to the effect that it would not be possible to engage
in commercial activities under the policy as it was
written.

209

8-10

Between the Pocatello flight and May 9, the Cessna was
parked in front of Thompson Beechcraft; it was gone
between the times Brown observed it parked there.

209

13-15

Brown did not have the keys to the Cessna during that
time; Brown did not know where the keys were during
that time.

209

18

On the morning of May 9, Brown got the keys to the
Cessna from the front desk at Thompson Beechcraft.

209

20-24

Diumenti had notified Thompson Beechcraft that Brown
would pick up the keys to the Cessna; there was a note
on "the board" that Brown would pick them up.

221

17-25

Diumenti told Brown at the meeting at Ritter's that he
would arrange for the insurance. MAC'S procedure was
that once the insurance company agreed to a new pilot,
MAC would start to use him. Brown inferred from the
fact that Diumenti cleared use of the plane that
insurance had been arranged.

222

3-9

Brown did not get clearance directly from Diumenti;
Ritter had talked with Diumenti's secretary, who had
talked with Diumenti.

225

13

Brown knew only in general terms of the arrangements
regarding the repairs to the Cessna 414 before May 9.

225

15

Ritter took care of those arrangements; he was the
business agent.

225

20-22

Brown was not concerned that repairs were being made
with no written agreement with the owner of the
aircraft; he had no reason to doubt that there was an
oral agreement which was enforceable.

226

3

Brown did not personally inquire of Diumenti's
insurance company as to whether he was covered to fly
the plane to Logan.
*
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(Not For P u b l i c a t i o n )

Plaintiffs and Appellees,
Case No. 910040-CA
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L a r r v H. Brown and A r t h u r J .
Ritter,
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D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t .

Third Districtf Salt Lake County
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Attorneys:

Brian M. Barnard and John Pace, Salt Lake City, for
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Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Orme.
GARFF, Judge:
Defendant Larry H. Brown appeals the trial court's ruling
that he breached an oral agreement to obtain insurance to protect
against damage to plaintiffs' airplane, which was leased to
Arthur J. Ritter and Brown.
The trial court found that in 1984, Ritter and Brown leased
plaintiffs' airplane. The covurt also found that the parties
orally agreed that Brown and Ritter would use the airplane only
after they had been added to plaintiffs' insurance or after they
had obtained their own insurance. Pursuant to this agreement,
the parties understood that the insurance would cover the use of
the airplane by Ritter and Brown. The court further found that
Ritter and Brown failed to obtain the requisite insurance.
On May 9, 1984, the airplane, while in the possession of
Ritter and Brown, was damaged during a landing at the Tooele
Valley Airport. When the accident occurred, neither Brown nor
Ritter were covered by plaintiffs' existing insurance policy on

r

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

the airplane, nor had they obtained insurance covering their
operation of the airplane.
Plaintiffs sued Ritter and Brown claiming (1) breach of
contract; (2) negligence; and (3) bailment. The case was tried
in April 1989. After plaintiffs' case in chief, Brown moved to
dismiss plaintiffs7 breach of contract claim, which motion was
granted. The court took the matter under advisement after the
trial.
The court issued a memorandum decision on June 14, 1989,
adjudicating defendants liable, jointly and severally, to
plaintiffs based on a contractual theory. On July 18, 1989, the
court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment. The court ruled that defendants7 liability was based
solely on a breach of contract by failing to obtain insurance to
cover damage to the airplane. The court did not refer to
plaintiffs7 negligence or bailment causes of action in its
memorandum decision, findings, or conclusions.
Brown argues that the trial court erred in granting judgment
against him on a contractual theory. We do not defer to the
court7s legal conclusion concerning the imposition of liability
for breach of contract, but review it for correctness. Scharf v.
BMG Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
Brown claims that the court misled him by dismissing the
first cause of action alleging a contract between the parties and
subsequently imposing liability based on breach of contract.
Thus, he contends the court deprived him of the opportunity to
defend against the breach of contract claim in his case in chief.
In contrast, plaintiffs argue that their bailment cause of action
also sounded in contract, and that the court based its ruling on
the bailment cause of action rather than on the breach of
contract claim, which was previously dismissed. Plaintiffs7
argument is without merit. We recognize that the "relation
[between] bailor and bailee is created in contract." Potomac
Ins. Co. v. Nickson, 64 Utah 395, 231 P. 445, 448 (1924); see
also Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc. , 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680,
685 (1943) ("the entire duty of the bailee with respect to the
bailed chattel is based on the bailment contract").1 The court,
however, did not refer to bailment in its memorandum decision,
1. A bailment is created when a party7s personal property is
delivered to another "in trust for a specific purpose, with an
express or implied contract that the property will be returned or
accounted for when the specific purpose has been accomplished or
when the bailor reclaims the property." Christensen v. Hoover,
643 P.2d 525, 528-29 (Colo. 1982).

^

findings, or conclusions• Moreover, the court did not make any
findings or conclusions concerning negligence, which is the basis
for liability in a cause of action for bailment. Sumsionr 132
P.2d at 685-86; see also Barlow Upholstery & Furniture v. Emmel,
533 P.2d 900, 901 (Utah 1975) (a "bailee has a duty to exercise
reasonable care and caution commensurate with acceptance of the
responsibility of safekeeping the property of others entrusted to
him").
Therefore, we conclude that the court erred when, after
dismissing the first cause of action for breach of contract, it
concluded that Brown was liable to plaintiffs for breach of
contract. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) r the
dismissal "operates as an adjudication on the merits" of the
breach of contract claim.2 In reliance on the courts dismissal,
Brown did not present evidence in defense of the breach of
contract claim. Because Brown was prejudiced3 by the dismissal
and subsequent ruling based on breach of contract, we reverse the
trial courts judgment and remand for a determination of the

2. Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in
relevant part:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided
for in this rule . . . operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
3. Cf. Radlev v. Smith. 6 Utah 314, 313 P.2d 465, 467 (1957)
("[a] party who is advised of the issues and given full and fair
opportunity to meet them is in no position to claim surprise or
error as to the issues litigated"); National Farmers Union
Property and Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249,
253 (1955) ("if an issue is to be tried and a party's rights
concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice thereof and
an opportunity to meet it"); Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 545, 236
P.2d 451, 455 (1951) (court did not err in reinstating previously
dismissed count because "[t]here is no showing that the
defendants were misled or prevented from presenting all their
evidence or in any way prejudiced by reinstating the count") .
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negligence and bailment claims on which t h e c o u r t d i d not r u l e .
Inasmuj^^Ss^the p a r t i e s hav^ presented a l l t h e i r e v i d e n c e , we see
no rygted f o r A new t s i a l .

fegnal W. Garff,

Judge/V

WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, kludge

Gregory^. Orme, Judge

COVER SHEET
CASE TITLE:
Douglas J. Allred and George S. Diumneti,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
Case No. 910040-CA
Larry H. Brown and Arthur J. Ritter,
Defendants and Appellant.
May 12, 1992. MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Publication).
Opinion of the Court by REGNAL W. GARFF, Judge; NORMAN
H. JACKSON, and GREGORY K. ORME, Judges, concur.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of May, 1992, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION was
deposited in the United States mail to each of the parties listed
below:
Brian M. Barnard
(Argued)
John Pace
Utah Legal Clinic
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3204
William H. Lindsley
James Lewis
(Argued)
Diumenti & Lindsley
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, UT 84010
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION
was deposited in the United States mail to the district court
judge listed below:
Honorable James S. Sawaya
Third District Court Judge
240 East 400 South, Room 501
Salt Lake City, UT
84111

Shu $MMH]
Deputy C l e p :
TRIAL COURT:
Third D i s t r i c t , S a l t Lake County C-86-3354

James C. Lewis #1943
DIUMENTL LEWIS & HART
Attorney for Plaintiff
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: 292-0447

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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GEORGE S. DIUMENTL

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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vs.

LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR,
J. RITTER

Case No. C86-3354
Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendant.

On June 8, 1993, defendant's Motion to Amend Findings came on for oral argument, with
James C. Lewis appearing for plaintiffs, and Brian Barnard appearing for defendant. The matter
was fully argued and submitted. Based upon the pleadings submitted in this matter, and oral
argument, the Court finds as follows:

[

EXHIBIT
"b"

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In 1984, plaintiffs delivered to defendants sole possession and control of a twin

engine Cessna 414 (the "airplane").
2.

After taking sole possession and control of the airplane, defendant made use of the

airplane.
3.

Defendant Brown was present and participated at a meeting wherein the lease or

use of the aircraft was discussed. In addition, at such meeting, the parties, and defendant Brown
discussed specifically obtaining insurance on the plane.
4.

On or about May 9, 1984, while defendant Brown was piloting the plane, the

airplane crashed at the Tooele Valley Airport, resulting in substantial property damage in the sum
of $33,133.86.
5.

Prior to the airplane crash, defendant Brown flew the plane, did landings on a

flight to Pocatello, Idaho, under the supervision of the owners and a pilot they had retained for
that flight. Defendant Brown inspected and viewed the plane on various other occasions prior
to the airplane crash to make sure that he knew where the controls were, their functions and how
operate them.
6.

Prior to the airplane crash, Brown inquired of the airplane's physical condition in

conversations with Bart Harker, the individual who Brown described as "our mechanic and who
was doing some work on the airplane.
7.

In connection with the delivery of possession and control of the airplane to

defendants, defendants agreed to obtain insurance on the aircraft.
2

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The evidence before the Court supports a finding that possession and control of the
airplane was delivered to defendants under a bailment arrangement, and that defendants were
bailees under such arrangement.
8.

The evidence further supports a finding that, under the bailment, there was an

express agreement between the parties that defendants would obtain insurance to cover the
airplane during the time the airplane was in the defendants possession.
9.

During the time the airplane was in defendant's possession, defendants, as bailees,

had sole possession and right to control the airplane.
10.

As a result of defendants failure to obtain insurance, plaintiffs were damaged in

the sum of $33,133.86.
11.

That defendants, as bailees of the airplane, were responsible for any damages

caused to the aircraft as a result of their failure to obtain insurance as agreed.
12.

That plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment against defendant Brown for the sum of

$33,133.86, together with interest thereon from December, 1986.
Dated this

day of July, 1993.

James S. Sawaya
District Judge

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing this

t-t-*o day of July, 1993, to:

Brian M. Barnard, Utah Legal Clinic, 214 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204.

SSk^ok-

4

James C. Lewis #1943
DIUMENTT, LEWIS & HART
Attorney for Plaintiff
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: 292-0447

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and,
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. C86-3354
Judge James S. Sawaya

LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR
J. ROTER,
Defendant

The m a t t e r of defendant

Larry H. Brown's Motion t o Amend

Findings came on f o r h e a r i n g on June, 8, 1993, before Judge James
S. Sawaya; p l a i n t i f f s were represented by c o u n s e l , James C. Lewis;
defendant was r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel, B r i a n M. Barnard.

The matter

was f u l l y p r e s e n t e d , argued and submitted, and t h e C o u r t ' s decision
thereon was taken under advisement.

The C o u r t having reviewed the

p l e a d i n g s and t h e e v i d e n c e i n the matter, and having considered the
submissions and arguments of counsel, and h a v i n g t h e r e t o f o r e signed
DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT
"c"

and f i l e d

h e r e i n Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now

e n t e r s judgment as f o l l o w s :
P l a i n t i f f s a r e g r a n t e d judgment a g a i n s t defendant,
Brown,

in

the

sum of

$33,133.86,

plus

interest

Larry H.

thereon

from

December 1, 1986 through August 15, 1993 i n t h e sum of $29,270.59,
for a t o t a l judgment of $62,404.45.
Dated t h i s

1^

day of

S^K^7)btA

. 1993.

BY THE COURT:

M
JAMES S. SAWAYA
DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed first class, postage prepaid on
this 36?aay of August, 1993 to:

Brian M. Barnard
John Pace
Utah Legal Clinic
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB #0215
JOHN PACE
USB #5624
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
LARRY H. BROWN
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,

vs.

:

Civil No. C-86-3354

:

(Hon. J. Sawaya)

LARRY H. BROWN and
ARTHUR J. RITTER,
Defendants.

DEFENDANT LARRY H. BROWN hereby gives notice of his
appeal of that judgment entered against him in the above
matter as a result of the hearing in this matter on June 8,
1993, represented by a Minute Entry of June 17, 1993 and
embodied in an Order and Judgment served upon defendant's
counsel on August 30, 1993.
This appeal is to the Utah Court of Appeals.

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT
"d"

DATED this 9th day of SEPTEMBER, 1993.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant Brown

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the- foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to:
WILLIAM H. LINDSLEY
JAMES C. LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
on the 4TH day of SEPTEMBER, 1993, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0 2 1 5
JOHN PACE
USB # 5624
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys f o r Defendant/Appellant
LARRY H. BROWN
214 East F i f t h South
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI,

i

Plaintiffs,

'

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
& AMENDED FINDINGS &
FOR MORE FINDINGS
(Memo Included)

:

Civil No. C-86-3354

vs.
LARRY H. BROWN and
ARTHUR J. RITTER,

$1,-0^0-5351}

.
i

(Hon. J. Sawaya)

Defendants.

The remaining defendant Larry H . Brown, by and through
counsel, B r i a n M. Barnard and John Pace moves t h i s Court
pursuant t o Rule 52(b) and Rule 5 g ( a ) & (e) of the Utah
Rules

of Civil

Procedure

for a new

trial,

to make

additional

f i n d i n g s , and t o amend findings a n d in support of t h a t
motion s t a t e s a s f o l l o w s :

Negligence
1.

There has been a cause o f a c t i o n and claim o f

negligence a s s e r t e d in t h i s a c t i o n .

The n e g l i g e n c e

f

is

DEFENDANT'S 1
EXHIBIT
I

alleged to have occurred at about the time defendant Brown
landed the subject matter aircraft at the Tooele County
Airport.
2.

No evidence presented at trial establishes

negligence on the part of defendant Larry Brown.

The

testimony from Brown indicated that on approach to the
Tooele County Airport for landing, he had engaged the
landing gear, and that he had then verified visually on the
exterior and in the interior by a check of an indicator
light that the landing gear was in a down position ready for
landing the airplane. He testified that he knew the landing
gear was down upon approach and shortly before the plane was
to touch down.

Brown had no explanation as to why the

landing gear was not in its proper place when the plane came
into contact with the run way.

It is just as likely that

the equipment mal-functioned or was defective as it is that
Brown breached any duty of care.

Similarly, the plaintiffs

presented no explanation as to why the landing gear was not
in its proper place when the plane came into contact with
the run way.

Plaintiff did not present eye witnesses nor

proof as to the status of the gear.

Plaintiffs offered no

proof that the landing gear was in good working order.

2

3.

There was no evidence presented by plaintiffs (as

was their burden) to show negligence on the part of any one
which caused the crash and the damage to the airplane.
Plaintiffs have objected to defendant Brown's request that
the negligence cause of action be formally dismissed herein,
however, plaintiffs have not cited any evidence in the trial
record nor from the transcript of the trial that establish
that there was any negligence on the part of Brown that
caused damage to plaintiffs' airplane.
4.

In order to finalize and resolve the question of

negligence in this case, the Court should make a finding as
to whether or not there was negligence.

Bailment
5.

Defendant Brown requests this Court to make

specific findings as to the nature and terms of the bailment
which forms the basis for finding Brown liable for the harm
suffered by plaintiffs.
6.

Defendant Brown requests this Court to make factual

findings with specific citation to the Trial Report and
Transcript as to the nature and terms of the bailment which
forms the basis for finding Brown liable for the harm
suffered by plaintiffs.

3

WHEREFORE, this Court should enter a finding that there
was no negligence established or proved in this case and
dismiss the plaintiffs' claim and cause of action sounding
in negligence.

Further, Brown requests the Court to enter

specific findings (with citations to the trial record) as to
the terms and nature of the bailment which is the basis for
defendant Brown's liability herein.
DATED this 23RD day of JUNE, 1993.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, NEW
FINDINGS, MORE FINDINGS, ETC. to:
WILLIAM H. LINDSLEY
JAMES C. LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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on the 23RD day of JUNE, 1993, postage prepaid in the United
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UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant
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BRIAN M..BARNARD
USB § 0215
JOHN PACE
USB 4 5624
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
214 East F i f t h South
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9532 or 328-9532
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

DOUGLAS J . ALLRED and

NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION

GEORGE S. DIUMENTI,
Plaintiff
Case Number:
vs.

Judge:

LARRY H. BROWN and

J.

86-090-3354
S away a

ARTHUR J . RITTER,
Defendant
The following motion{s) are now at Issue and ready for decision of the court The documents
indicated have been filed with the court
(a) Type Qfmotion:
taj ypcoimown.
(b) Date filed:
(c)

For

f o r N e w

M K

Tria

^ - & Amend Findings &

Findings

June 2 3 . 199.3

Party filing motion: Remaining Defendant:

(d)
(e)

Motion

Affidavit In support
j>

Memorandum in support

(included i n motion)

(fl

Affidavit in opposition

(g)

Memorandum in opposition

(h)

Memorandum in reply

(i)

Other pleadlng(s) necessary to determine motion (specify):

DATED: AUGUST

(n&Y'

1993.

UTAH LEGAL CLINIC

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT
It^Tff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
to:
WILLIAM H. LINDSLEY
JAMES C. LEWIS

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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505 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84010
on the ^ % £ d a y of AUGUST, 1993, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and GEORGE
S. DIUMENTI,

CIVIL NO. C-86-3354
Plaintiffs,
vs.
LARRY H. BROWN and
ARTHUR J. RITTER,
Defendants and Third
Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
MERCURY AIRCOURIER SERVICE, a
Utah corporation,
Third Party Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for trial, commencing the 4th
day of April, 1989, with William H. Lindsley, Esq. appearing on
behalf of the plaintiff, and Brian M. Barnard, Esq. appearing on
behalf of the defendants, and Duane R. Smith, Esq. appearing on
behalf of the third party defendant*

The matter was fully

presented, argued and submitted, and the Court's decision thereon
was taken under advisement.

The Third Party Complaint in this

matter was dismissed upon motion of the third party plaintiff.
The Court having reviewed the pleadings and the evidence in this
matter, and having considered the submissions and arguments of

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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ALLRED V . BROWN

counsel, now makes i t s ruling and d e c i s i o n on t h i s matter,

as

follows:
The Court f i n d s
whether

the c r i t i c a l

issue

to t h i s case to be

there was in f a c t an agreement,

oral

in nature,

as

alleged and claimed by the p l a i n t i f f that defendants as part of
their agreement to rent or lease the a i r c r a f t in question from
the p l a i n t i f f s also agreed to provide insurance coverage for any
loss

or damage o c c a s i o n e d

by t h e i r

u s e of

the

aircraft*

Defendants allege that p l a i n t i f f s agreed as part of the agreement
of rental to provide and take care of
their use of the a i r c r a f t .

insurance coverage

for

Defendants further a l l e g e in defense

that the aircraft was being leased by Mercury Aircourier Service,
a c o r p o r a t i o n , rather than the defendants

individually.

The

Court finds that the greater weight of the evidence persuades the
Court, as follows:
1.

The p a r t i e s l e a s i n g the a i r c r a f t were the individual

defendants Brown and R i t t e r , and not the c o r p o r a t i o n , Mercury
Aircourier Service.
2.

The o r a l

agreement

between

t h e p a r t i e s was

that

defendants agreed e i t h e r to take steps to be added to p l a i n t i f f ' s
insurance,

or to o b t a i n their own insurance p o l i c y , either of

which would provide coverage for their use of the a i r c r a f t .
3.

Defendants breached the agreement to provide insurance

as required.

ALLRED V ,

4.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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BROWN

Plaintiffs

s u s t a i n e d damage and l o s s

in the sum of

$33/133.86 occasioned by damage to the a i r c r a f t

w h i l e i t was

being operated by the defendants, and in their c o n t r o l .
5.

Plaintiffs

are e n t i t l e d

t o and are hereby awarded

Judgment in the amount of $33/133.86/ and for i n t e r e s t

thereon

from December 1, 1986 to the present*
Counsel for p l a i n t i f f
Findings of F a c t /

i s requested to prepare

Conclusions of Law# and Judgment consistent

with the foregoing.
Dated t h i s

appropriate

14th

day of June/ 1989.

id
JAMES S. S&WAYA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ALLRED V . BROWN
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

/gi-flL day of June, 1989:

William H. Lindsley
Attorney for Plaintiff
505 S. Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Brian M. Barnard
Attorney for Defendants
214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
Duane R. Smith
Attorney for Third Party Defendant
4885 South 900 East, Suite 306
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY
William H. Lindsley #1966
D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: 292-0447
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS J* ALLRED, and
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI II,

:

Plaintiff,
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Case No, C86-3354
Judge James S. Sawaya

LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR J.
RITTER,

:

Defendants and Third
Party Plaintiffs,

:

vs.
jMERCURY AIRCOURIER SERVICE, a
Utah Corporation,
Third Party Defendant.

:
:

The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial on the
4th day of April, 1989, before The Honorable James S. Sawaya, judge
presiding, plaintiffs were present and represented

by counsel,

William H. Lindsley; defendants were present and represented by
counsel, Brian M. Barnard; third party defendant was represented
by counsel, Duane R. Smith.

The matter was fully presented, argued

and submitted, and the Court's decision thereon was taken under
advisement.

The Third Party Complaint was dismissed upon motion

of the Third Party Plaintiff.

The Court having

reviewed the

pleadings and the evidence in the matter, and having considered the
submissions and arguments of counsel, now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That Douglas J, Allred and George S. Diuraenti II were the
owners of an aircraft, a Cessna 414, registration number N8132Q,
serial number 4140032.
2. That pursuant to agreement by and between the owners of
the aircraft and Larry H. Brown and Arthur J. Ritter, the latter
leased said aircraft in or about the month of April 1984.
3. That the understanding by and between the parties was oral
in nature and pursuant thereto it was understood that Brown and
Ritter would use the aircraft only after they had taken steps to
be

added

to plaintiff's

insurance

or

after

obtaining

coverage

pursuant to their own insurance, that they would assure that use
of the aircraft was insured.
4. That defendants failed to take steps necessary to obtain
insurance coverage.
5. That the aircraft was damaged and there was a loss incurred
in the sum of 33,133.86, said damage and loss occurring while the
aircraft was in the control and possession of Brown and Ritter, and
while being operated by them.
6.

That

as

a

result

of

the

damage

to

the

aircraft

the

plaintiffs incurred a loss of the sum of $33,133.86.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That the failure of Brown and Ritter to assure that the

aircraft

was insured prior to their use of the plane

constituted

a breach of the contract with the p l a i n t i f f s .
2.

That as a r e s u l t of

defendants*

breach, p l a i n t i f f s

were

damaged in the sum of $ 3 ? , 1 3 3 . 8 6 .
3.
and

That p l a i n t i f f s

Rittet,

jointly

are e n t i t l e d

and s e v e r a l l y ,

t o a judgment a g a i n s t Brown
for

the

sum of

$33,133.86

t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n from December 1 , 1 9 8 6 .
Dated t h i s

day o f

, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

JAMES S. SAWAYA
DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby c e r t i f y
\M

<3ay of

t h a t I mailed a copy of t h e foregoing

T-sjX.VA

i 1989, to:

this

Brian M. Barnard, Attorney

a t Law, 214 East 500 South, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 and Duane
R. S m i t h , Attorney a t Law, 4885 South 900 E a s t ,
Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 7 .

S u i t e 306, Salt

DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY
William H. Lindsley #1966
p. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
([Telephone: 292-0447
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED, and
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI II,

:

Plaintiff,
:

JUDGMENT

:

Case No. C86-3354
Judge James S. Sawaya

vs.
LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR J.
RITTER,
Defendants and Third
Party Plaintiffs,

:
:

vs.
[MERCURY AIRCOURIER SERVICE, a
lUtah Corporation,
Third Party Defendant.

I

:
:

The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial on the

4th day of April, 1989, before The Honorable James S. Sawaya, judge
presiding, plaintiffs were present and represented by counsel,
William H. Lindsley; defendants were present and represented by
counsel, Brian M. Barnard; third party defendant was represented
by counsel, Duane R. Smith. The matter was fully presented, argued
and submitted, and the Court's decision thereon was taken under
advisement.

The Third Party Complaint was dismissed upon motion

of the Third Party Plaintiff.

The Court having reviewed the

pleadings and the evidence in the matter, and having considered the
submissions and arguments of counsel, and having heretofore signed
and filed herein its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now
enters judgment as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs

are

granted

judgment

against

defendants,

jointly and severally, in the sum of $33,133.86, plus interest
thereon from December 1, 1986 through June 14, 1989, in the sum of
$14,084,40, for a total judgment of $47,218.26.
Dated this

day of

f

1989.

BY THE COURT:

JAMES S. SAWAYA
DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby c e r t i f y
vD

day of

that I m a i l e d a copy of the f o r e g o i n g

N V)\v\

r 1989, t o :

this

Brian M. Barnard, Attorney

a t Law, 214 East 500 South, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 and Duane
R. Smith, Attorney a t Law, 4885 South 900 E a s t , S u i t e 3 0 6 ,
Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 7 .

Salt

UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
Attorneys for Defendants
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

:

C i v i l No.

:

MOTION TO AMEND
JUDGMENT or FOR NEW
TRIAL

:

(Hon. J. SAWAYA )

LARRY H. BROWN and
ARTHUR J . RITTER,
Defendants.

C-86-3354

THE DEFENDANTS pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure move the Court to amend the judgment and
memorandum decision dated June 14, 1989 addressing the
plaintiffs1 contract theory and cause of action and granting
a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and state as follows:
1.

Defendants have ordered (or will shortly order) a

transcript of the trial testimony of the plaintiff, George
S. Diumenti.
2.

Defendants recall the testimony of George Diumenti

to be that any agreement to provide insurance coverage was
an agreement only by the defendant Arthur Ritter and that
DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

the co-defendant Larry Brown was not a party to any such
agreement.
WHEREFORE, the defendants request that a new trial be
granted or in the alternative that the defendant Brown be
exonerated from any contract claim by the plaintiffs.
DATED this 20th day of June, 1989.

Attorney/ f

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of JUNE, 1989, I
caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing
pleading MOTION TO AMEND OR FOR NEW TRIAL to:
WILLIAM H. LINDSLEY
Attorney for Plaintiffs
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.

RIAN W. BARNARD

\fy for Defendants
Attorney

UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB } 0215
JOHN PACE
USB # 5624
Attorneys for Defendant Brown
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, UTAH
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and
GEORGE S. DIUMNETI,
Plaintiffs,

:

Civil No. C-86-3354

:

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

vs.
LARRY H. BROWN and
ARTHUR J. RITTER,
Defendant.

:

(Hon. J. SAWAYA )

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court
on the Motion of the Defendant Larry H. Brown for a New
Trial, (dated June 20, 1989), the Court having reviewed the
matter and having considered the arguments of the parties,
the Court having made a minute entry of August 28, 1989
indicating the Courtfs ruling, based thereon and for good
cause appearing,

(

DEFENDANT'S 1
EXHIBIT
I

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
motion of the defendant Larry H. Brown for a new trial
should be and hereby is denied.
DATED this

l"7 - day of JULY, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

I

i

JAMES SAWAYA
JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of JULY, 1990, I
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing pleading ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR HEW TRIAL to:
WILLIAM H. LINDSLEY
Attorney for Plaintiffs
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah
84010
counsel for the opposing party, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.

DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY
William H. Lindsley
Attorney for Plaintiff
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: 292*0447
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE

COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS J . ALLRED and GEORGE S.

:

DIUMENTI,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

vs.

LARRY H. BROWN and ARTHUR J , RITTER,
Deferriants.

:

Case No.

'

(Hon

-

C-86-3354

James

Sawa

7a)

Plaintiffs complain of defendants and a l l e g e as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. P l a i n t i f f s a r e i n d i v i d u a l s , r e s i d e n t s of Davis County, State of
Utah.
2. P l a i n t i f f s were and a r e t h e owners of a 1970 Cessna Model 414
a i r c r a f t , N 8132 Q.
3 . In or a b o u t t h e l a t t e r p a r t of A p r i l 1984, p l a i n t i f f s and
defendants entered i n t o an agreement whereby p l a i n t i f f s

were t o a l l o w

defendants t h e use and p o s s e s s i o n of t h e Cessna 414 a i r c r a f t averred to in
paragraph 2 hereof,
4. In consideration thereof, defendants were to i n s u r e and maintain
insurance on t h e a i r c r a f t in favor of p l a i n t i f f s , which insurance was to
include l i a b i l i t y and damage in the amounts and d e d u c t i b l e s then enjoyed by

p l a i n t i f f s through t h e i r insurance with The Insurance Company of America,
Valene Agency Incorporated, agent, of which p o l i c y , company and agency the
defendants were afforded n o t i c e . In a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o , defendants were to
hangar the aircraft at their expense, pay for a l l fuel and oil attendant their
use of the aircraft and pay to p l a i n t i f f s t h e sum of $100.00 per hour for
every hour of their u s e .
5 . Attendant s a i d agreement, defendants took possession of the
aircraft on the 30th day of April, 1984.
6• On the 9th day of May, 1984, at approximately 8:55 a.m. defendants,
while operating the a i r c r a f t at the Tooele V a l l e y Airport, damaged the
aircraft*
7 . Defendants had f a i l e d to o b t a i n insurance of any nature or
endorsements covering t h e i r operation of t h e a i r c r a f t , which

failure

c o n s t i t u t e d a breach o f t h e i r agreement with plaintiffs and as a result of
said breach, plaintiffs have been damaged in the sua of $30,000.00 attendant
the repair of the a i r c r a f t and further sums to be proved at trial resulting
from the loss of use of the aircraft.
WHEREFORE, p l a i n t i f f s pray for judgment in the sum of $30,000.00 plus
interest thereon and such further sums as proved at t r i a l .
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

8. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 5 of the First Cause of
Action as if fully s e t forth herein.
9. On the 9th day of May, 1984, a t the Tooele Valley Airport, in
Tooele, Utah, at approximately 8:55 a.m. the defendants operated the a i r c r a f t
in a negligent fashion in disregard for acknowledged and standard practices of
operation, as a result of which negligence the defendants damaged the airplane

in the sum of $30,000.00 and further sums to be proved at trial resulting from
the loss of use of the aircraft*
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against defendants in the sum
of $30/000.00 plus interest thereon and such further sums as proved at trial.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
10. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1# 2, 3, 5, 6 and 9 above as if
fully set forth herein.
11. That the defendant were bailees of the aircraft, the defendant the
bailors. The defendants are obligated to the plaintiffs in the sum of
$30f000.00 as a result of the bailment and subsequent events.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against defendants in the sum
of $30,000.00 plus interest thereon.
Dated this ^"7 day of May, 1986.

William H. Lindsley
Attorney for Plaintiffs

y

